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MUCH ADO ABOUT NOTHING?: WHAT 
THE NUMBERS TELL US ABOUT HOW 
STATE COURTS APPLY THE 
UNCONSCIONABILITY DOCTRINE TO 
ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS 
 
SUSAN LANDRUM 
This Article evaluates how state courts have applied the 
unconscionability doctrine to contracts, including those involving 
arbitration agreements.  Numerous scholars have been critical of state 
courts’ application of the unconscionability doctrine to arbitration 
agreements and have argued that, because state courts are often skeptical 
or even hostile to arbitration, at least some state courts have used the 
unconscionability doctrine more often to invalidate arbitration 
agreements than other types of contract provisions.  These assumptions 
hold true for some individual states or limited time periods, but further 
research was necessary to determine if the assumptions are true more 
broadly.  For purposes of this study, I analyzed the unconscionability 
case law, a total of 460 cases, from twenty states—Alaska, Arkansas, 
Colorado, Illinois, Maine, Maryland, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, 
Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Mexico, North 
Carolina, Ohio, Oregon, Rhode Island, South Carolina, and Vermont—
during the time period from 1980 to 2012.  The results of my research 
demonstrate that there is significant variation in how courts apply the 
unconscionability doctrine.  Moreover, this Article shows that, for many 
of these states, the assumptions that scholars have had regarding state 
courts’ hostility to arbitration agreements, and those courts’ willingness to 
use the unconscionability doctrine as a means of invalidating arbitration 
provisions, are not always supported by the case law.  Instead of applying 
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generalized assumptions, it is necessary to delve deeper into the case law 
of each individual state to understand that state’s use of the 
unconscionability doctrine in the context of arbitration agreements. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
As the United States Supreme Court has observed on more than one 
occasion, the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA)1 “was enacted in 1925 in 
response to widespread judicial hostility to arbitration agreements.”2  
Even after passage of the FAA, however, there have continued to be 
cases where courts treat arbitration agreements with more skepticism 
than other contracts.3  In fact, legal scholars have long argued that at 
least some state courts routinely view arbitration agreements with more 
hostility than other types of contract provisions and, thus, are more 
likely to use contract defenses—most specifically, the unconscionability 
doctrine—to invalidate arbitration clauses.4  While it is undeniably true 
 
1. Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–16 (2012). 
2. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1745 (2011); Federal Arbitration 
Act, ch. 213, 43 Stat. 883 (1925) (codified as amended at 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–16 (2012)); see also 
Hall St. Assocs., L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 581 (2008); Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson 
Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 24 (1991) (noting that the FAA’s “purpose was to reverse the 
longstanding judicial hostility to arbitration agreements that had existed at English common 
law and had been adopted by American courts”).  Legal scholars have also discussed the 
history of courts’ treatment, prior to the passage of the FAA, of arbitration agreements.  See, 
e.g., Jodi Wilson, How the Supreme Court Thwarted the Purpose of the Federal Arbitration 
Act, 63 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 91, 97–102 (2012); Kenneth F. Dunham, Southland Corp. v. 
Keating Revisited: Twenty-Five Years in Which Direction?, 4 CHARLESTON L. REV. 331, 333–
35 (2010) (discussing treatment of arbitration by British and early United States courts); 
Preston Douglas Wigner, Comment, The United States Supreme Court’s Expansive Approach 
to the Federal Arbitration Act: A Look at the Past, Present, and Future of Section 2, 29 U. 
RICH. L. REV. 1499, 1502 (1995) (same). 
3. See, e.g., Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 56 (1974) (“The purpose and 
procedures of Title VII indicate that Congress intended federal courts to exercise final 
responsibility for enforcement of Title VII; deferral to arbitral decisions would be 
inconsistent with that goal.”); Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of Am., 350 U.S. 198, 201–03, 205 
(1956) (“For the remedy by arbitration, whatever its merits or shortcomings, substantially 
affects the cause of action created by the State.”); see also Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl, The 
Unconscionability Game: Strategic Judging and the Evolution of Federal Arbitration Law, 83 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1420, 1422 (2008) (“Some lower courts (mostly certain state courts, but also a 
few federal courts) view arbitration with more skepticism, especially in cases involving 
consumers or employees who have signed nonnegotiated arbitration agreements embedded in 
standard-form contracts.”); Stephen Friedman, Arbitration Provisions: Little Darlings and 
Little Monsters, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 2035, 2035, 2044–46 (2011) (“While arbitration 
provisions are favored under the FAA, they are viewed far more skeptically by courts 
applying unconscionability to refuse enforcement of one-sided arbitration provisions.”). 
4. See generally Stephen A. Broome, An Unconscionable Application of the 
Unconscionability Doctrine: How the California Courts Are Circumventing the Federal 
Arbitration Act, 3 HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 39 (2006); Bruhl, supra note 3, at 1466–68; Steven J. 
Burton, The New Judicial Hostility to Arbitration: Federal Preemption, Contract 
Unconscionability, and Agreements to Arbitrate, 2006 J. DISP. RESOL. 469; Friedman, supra 
note 3, at 2045, 2067; Sandra F. Gavin, Unconscionability Found: A Look at Pre-Dispute 
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that state courts have applied the unconscionability doctrine to 
arbitration clauses,5 often in a way that is different than those same 
courts have applied the doctrine to other types of contracts,6 the story of 
the unconscionability doctrine in recent decades is far more complex 
than it may first appear on the surface. 
As previously mentioned, within the past decade some legal scholars 
have evaluated state courts’ application of the unconscionability 
doctrine to arbitration agreements and have come to the conclusion that 
courts still often apply unconscionability in a way that demonstrates 
hostility to arbitration.7  Usually these scholars have focused on a very 
limited number of cases or have analyzed only a small time period in 
coming to this conclusion.8  Their work has provided valuable insights 
regarding inconsistencies in state courts’ unconscionability analysis and 
the importance of courts treating arbitration agreements the same way 
that they treat other types of contracts.  At the same time, however, 
such an approach may have the tendency to focus on outliers that are 
 
Mandatory Arbitration Agreements 10 Years After Doctor’s Associates, Inc. v. Casarotto, 54 
CLEV. ST. L. REV. 249 (2006); David Horton, Unconscionability Wars, 106 NW. U. L. REV. 
387 (2012); Charles L. Knapp, Blowing the Whistle on Mandatory Arbitration: 
Unconscionability as a Signaling Device, 46 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 609 (2009); Lucille M. Ponte, 
Getting a Bad Rap? Unconscionability in Clickwrap Dispute Resolution Clauses and a 
Proposal for Improving the Quality of These Online Consumer “Products,” 26 OHIO ST. J. ON 
DISP. RESOL. 119 (2011); Susan Randall, Judicial Attitudes Toward Arbitration and the 
Resurgence of Unconscionability, 52 BUFF. L. REV. 185 (2004); Jeffrey W. Stempel, 
Arbitration, Unconscionability, and Equilibrium: The Return of Unconscionability Analysis as 
a Counterweight to Arbitration Formalism, 19 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 757 (2004).  In 
AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, the U.S. Supreme Court cited Broome’s and Randall’s 
articles for the proposition that California courts are more likely to declare arbitration 
agreements unconscionable than other types of contracts.  AT&T Mobility LLC, 131 S. Ct. at 
1747 (citing Broome, supra at 54, 66; Randall, supra at 186–87). 
5. See, e.g., Wigginton v. Dell, Inc., 890 N.E.2d 541 (Ill. App. Ct. 2008); Brown v. MHN 
Gov’t Servs., Inc., 306 P.3d 948 (Wash. 2013). 
6. See Broome, supra note 4, at 54. 
7. See supra note 4 and accompanying text. 
8. For example, Professor Susan Randall compared unconscionability claims in cases 
from 1982 to 1983 and from 2002 to 2003 and concluded that, during the earlier period, courts 
found nonarbitration and arbitration agreements unconscionable at the same rate, but, twenty 
years later, courts were twice as likely to find arbitration agreements to be unconscionable 
than other types of contracts.  See Randall, supra note 4, at 187, 194.  More recently, Professor 
Lucille M. Ponte evaluated the special legal challenges associated with applying the 
unconscionability doctrine to clickwrap dispute resolution clauses in online consumer 
contracts.  See generally Ponte, supra note 4.  However, Ponte’s article discussed a range of 
examples of how various courts have addressed the issue rather than taking a quantitative 
approach.  See id.  For further discussion of the relevant scholarly research on this topic, see 
infra Part III. 
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not necessarily representative of a state’s general approach to the 
enforceability of arbitration agreements, or it may illustrate a short-term 
trend in unconscionability analysis that is not representative of the 
courts’ approach to this issue over a longer period of time. 
In order to have a fuller understanding of how state courts apply the 
unconscionability doctrine to arbitration agreements, it is necessary to 
analyze those courts’ approaches to unconscionability analysis over an 
extended period of time, comparing the application of the doctrine to 
both arbitration agreements and other types of contracts.  This Article 
does just that.  Specifically, this Article explores how, since 1980, state 
appellate courts have applied the unconscionability doctrine to all types 
of contracts, including those involving arbitration agreements.9  In all, I 
have analyzed the unconscionability case law from twenty states, which 
were chosen from across the United States.10  All together, this case law 
included a total of 460 appellate cases.11  From this case law I have 
determined that (1) some state courts have rarely, if ever, used the 
unconscionability doctrine to invalidate contract provisions, whether or 
 
9. I chose to only address appellate cases, including those from intermediate state 
appellate courts and state supreme courts, because very few trial court opinions are accessible 
on Westlaw.  This study utilizes both published and unpublished state appellate court 
opinions to the extent that they are available on Westlaw.  I did not include cases in which the 
state appellate court applied the unconscionability law of another state, i.e., an Ohio court 
applying Kentucky unconscionability law.  I also did not include cases in which a federal court 
applied state substantive law regarding unconscionability.  Thus, the only cases included in 
this study were cases in which a state appellate court applied its own state’s law regarding the 
unconscionability doctrine.  Moreover, because courts often apply the unconscionability 
doctrine differently in domestic relations cases, such as those dealing with prenuptial 
agreements or marital settlement agreements, than they do to other types of cases, I did not 
include domestic relations unconscionability cases in my research. 
10. The twenty states include: Alaska, Arkansas, Colorado, Illinois, Maine, Maryland, 
Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New 
Mexico, North Carolina, Ohio, Oregon, Rhode Island, South Carolina, and Vermont.  I 
consciously chose not to include California, as Stephen Broome’s article has already looked at 
California’s unconscionability case law in significant detail, albeit for a shorter period of time 
than the instant study.  See generally Broome, supra note 4.  I wanted to include states that 
may have been referenced in other scholarly articles, but without the amount of attention that 
California has received. 
11. This number does not include cases where unconscionability was merely mentioned 
as a legal concept, i.e., as one of the possible defenses in a breach of contract action, but the 
unconscionability doctrine was not actually applied in the case.  I have included three types of 
cases in this study: (1) cases in which the court determined that the challenged contract 
provision was unconscionable; (2) cases in which the court determined that the challenged 
contract provision was not unconscionable; and (3) cases in which the court considered the 
unconscionability issue but remanded to the trial court because the issue needed to be 
considered there in the first instance. 
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not the challenged provisions are associated with arbitration; (2) other 
states have evenly applied the unconscionability doctrine to all types of 
contracts; (3) at some points in their history, some state courts may have 
been more inclined to hold an arbitration clause unconscionable, but 
that inclination does not reflect their long-term tendencies or the 
current status of their law; and (4) a small number of states’ cases do 
reflect the stereotype of hostility towards arbitration, at least in some 
form.12  Thus, the immediate lesson to take from this analysis is that 
there is much more complexity to the issue than what might appear on 
the surface. 
In Part II of this Article, I summarize the general law related to the 
unconscionability doctrine in both the arbitration and non-arbitration 
context.  Part III provides a little more context for the scholarly debate 
over the application of the unconscionability doctrine to arbitration 
agreements by setting up what we have learned so far from this 
scholarship and what questions still remain unanswered.  Then, Part IV 
discusses the results of the instant study, including (1) the large-scale 
numbers demonstrating what has happened collectively throughout the 
time period of the study, and (2) the numbers broken down by state, 
focusing on the range of state court approaches to unconscionability 
issues.  Having set out the numbers, the final part draws conclusions 
about what the numbers show us about how courts apply 
unconscionability to arbitration agreements.13  In doing so, I argue that 
some of the unease regarding how state courts apply unconscionability 
may be unnecessary, and I set out what areas of concern still exist for 
the future.14 
II. THE GENERAL LAW ON UNCONSCIONABILITY IN THE CONTEXT OF 
BOTH ARBITRATION AND NON-ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS 
In order to have a context for this Article’s analysis of 
unconscionability outcomes in state courts’ contract cases, it is 
important to understand the intersection of the law governing 
arbitration agreements and general contract law.  That relationship is 
dictated, at least to a certain extent, by federal law, including the FAA 
and U.S. Supreme Court case law interpreting that Act.15  However, 
 
12. See infra Part IV; infra Table 2. 
13. See infra Part V. 
14. See infra Part V. 
15. See, e.g., Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–16 (2012); Marmet Health Care Ctr., 
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contract law in general and the unconscionability doctrine specifically 
are primarily products of state law, not federal law.16  Thus, in the 
remainder of Part II, this Article sets forth the basic relevant principles 
of federal and state law with respect to arbitration agreements, state 
contract law, and the unconscionability doctrine. 
A. The Intersection of Arbitration Agreements and General Contract Law 
Because arbitration agreements are contracts, the rules that apply to 
other contracts should also apply to arbitration agreements.17  In 
general, the construction, interpretation, and enforcement of contracts 
are governed by state law, not federal law.  There is more complexity, 
however, in cases involving arbitration agreements.  As mentioned 
supra, unlike other types of contracts, the starting point for arbitration 
agreements is federal law, specifically the FAA.18  Section 2 of the FAA 
provides the foundation for courts’ evaluations of arbitration 
agreements by requiring that an arbitration agreement “shall be valid, 
irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or 
in equity for the revocation of any contract.”19  Courts have interpreted 
this provision to mean that contract defenses such as duress, 
unconscionability, and mistake apply to arbitration agreements, just as 
those defenses apply to other types of contracts.20 
 
Inc. v. Brown, 132 S. Ct. 1201 (2012) (per curiam); AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. 
Ct. 1740, 1745 (2011); Hall St. Assocs., L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576 (2008); Preston v. 
Ferrer, 552 U.S. 346 (2008); Doctor’s Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681 (1996); Allied-
Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265 (1995); Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane 
Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991); Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483 (1987); Southland Corp. v. Keating, 
465 U.S. 1 (1984); Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1 (1983); 
Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395 (1967). 
16. See Rent-A-Center, W., Inc. v. Jackson, 130 S. Ct. 2772, 2784 n.7 (2010) (“The 
question of unconscionability . . . is one of state law.” (citing Perry, 482 U.S. at 492 n.9)); Fid. 
Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 174 (1982) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) 
(“Contract and real property law are traditionally the domain of state law.” (citing Aronson 
v. Quick Point Pencil Co., 440 U.S. 257, 262 (1979); Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48, 55 
(1979))). 
17. See AT&T Mobility LLC, 131 S. Ct. at 1745–46; Perry, 482 U.S. at 492 n.9. 
18. Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–16 (2012); see also supra note 15 and 
accompanying text. 
19. 9 U.S.C. § 2.  The New Mexico Supreme Court has noted that this provision requires 
consideration of both state contract law and federal law interpreting the FAA.  Rivera v. Am. 
Gen. Fin. Servs., Inc., 259 P.3d 803, 810 (N.M. 2011). 
20. See AT&T Mobility LLC, 131 S. Ct. at 1746; Doctor’s Assocs., Inc., 517 U.S. at 686–
87.  But see Edward P. Boyle & David N. Cinotti, Beyond Nondiscrimination: AT&T Mobility 
LLC v. Concepcion and the Further Federalization of U.S. Arbitration Law, 12 PEPP. DISP. 
RESOL. L.J. 373, 374 (2012) (arguing that AT&T Mobility LLC “increases the federal 
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Although the FAA provides that ordinary contract defenses, such as 
unconscionability, may make arbitration agreements unenforceable in 
certain circumstances, the problem arises when a court applies those 
defenses differently to arbitration agreements than to other types of 
contract provisions.21  The U.S. Supreme Court has provided some 
guidance for other courts in this context.22  The most obvious situation 
that would run afoul of the FAA is where a state’s statutory or case law 
prohibits outright the arbitration of a particular type of claim.23  Some 
cases, however, involve much more complexity than a blatant conflict 
 
restraints on state contract law by holding that even the application of a generally available 
contract defense like unconscionability, as interpreted by a state’s highest court, can be 
preempted under the FAA” (citing AT&T Mobility LLC, 131 S. Ct. at 1761 (Breyer, J., 
dissenting))).  One scholar speculated that, after AT&T Mobility, the unconscionability 
doctrine may no longer have the same potential to challenge arbitration agreements.  See 
Thomas J. Stipanowich, The Third Arbitration Trilogy: Stolt-Nielsen, Rent-A-Center, 
Concepcion, and the Future of American Arbitration, 22 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 323, 380 (2011) 
(“In the wake of Concepcion, one wonders what if anything is left of the doctrine of 
unconscionability in the realm of arbitration agreements.  Coupled with Rent-A-Center, 
Concepcion appears to have dramatically diminished the potential scope of this primary tool 
for judicial policing of overreaching.”).  However, as this study demonstrates, courts have 
continued to apply the unconscionability doctrine to arbitration agreements post-AT&T 
Mobility LLC and it is unclear what the long-term effect of this case will be. 
21. See Perry, 482 U.S. at 492 n.9 (“We note . . . the choice-of-law issue that arises when 
defenses such as . . . unconscionability arguments are asserted.  In instances such as these, the 
text of § 2 provides the touchstone for choosing between state-law principles and the 
principles of federal common law envisioned by the passage of that statute: An agreement to 
arbitrate is valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, as a matter of federal law, ‘save upon such 
grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.’  Thus state law, 
whether of legislative or judicial origin, is applicable if that law arose to govern issues 
concerning the validity, revocability, and enforceability of contracts generally.” (internal 
citations omitted) (quoting Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1982)) (citing Moses H. 
Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983))). 
22. See generally Marmet Health Care Ctr., Inc. v. Brown, 132 S. Ct. 1201 (2012) (per 
curiam); AT&T Mobility LLC, 131 S. Ct. 1740; Preston v. Ferrer, 552 U.S. 346 (2008); 
Doctor’s Assocs., Inc., 517 U.S. 681; Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265 
(1995); Perry, 482 U.S. 483; Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp., 460 U.S. 1; Southland Corp. v. 
Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984); Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395 
(1967). 
23. See, e.g., Marmet Health Care Ctr., Inc., 132 S. Ct. at 1203–04 (“West Virginia’s 
prohibition against predispute agreements to arbitrate personal-injury or wrongful-death 
claims against nursing homes is a categorical rule prohibiting arbitration of a particular type 
of claim, and that rule is contrary to the terms and coverage of the FAA.”); AT&T Mobility 
LLC, 131 S. Ct. at 1747; Preston, 552 U.S. at 353, 362–63 (holding that the FAA preempts 
state law granting the state commissioner exclusive jurisdiction to decide an issue that the 
parties agreed by contract to arbitrate); Doctor’s Assocs., Inc., 517 U.S. at 687 (“Courts may 
not . . . invalidate arbitration agreements under state laws applicable only to arbitration 
provisions.”). 
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with the FAA.  Specifically, the Supreme Court has observed that a 
generally applicable contract defense could still be preempted by the 
FAA if courts apply it in a way that disfavors arbitration.24  One 
example of this would be if a court found a contract unconscionable 
solely because it determined that an arbitration clause violated public 
policy in a way that other contracts would not.25  Even prior to the U.S. 
Supreme Court’s decision in AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 
scholars remarked that, in many cases, there was significant difficulty in 
determining whether a court had inconsistently and unfavorably applied 
a generally-applicable contract doctrine to an arbitration agreement.26 
Furthermore, in applying the U.S. Supreme Court’s precedents 
regarding the FAA, some state courts have also articulated a strong 
policy in favor of enforcing arbitration agreements.  For example, on 
multiple occasions the Ohio Supreme Court has affirmed this 
presumption in favor of arbitration agreements, noting that “an 
arbitration clause is to be upheld just as any other provision in a 
contract should be respected.”27  In fact, the Ohio Supreme Court has 
 
24. See AT&T Mobility LLC, 131 S. Ct. at 1747–48; Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos., 513 
U.S. at 281; Perry, 482 U.S. at 492 n.9.  To illustrate this point, the Supreme Court provided 
the following examples that would be preempted by the FAA: (1) a court refusing to enforce 
a consumer arbitration agreement because the agreement did not have a provision allowing 
judicially monitored discovery; (2) a court determining that an arbitration agreement that did 
not follow the Federal Rules of Evidence; and (3) a court invalidating an arbitration 
agreement that did not allow a determination by a jury panel or its equivalent.  AT&T 
Mobility LLC, 131 S. Ct. at 1747. 
25. See Marmet Health Care Ctr., Inc., 132 S. Ct. at 1204 (noting that, to the extent that 
the state court’s unconscionability finding was based on the court’s determination that “a 
predispute arbitration agreement that applies to claims of personal injury or wrongful death 
against nursing homes ‘clearly violates public policy,’” such a finding would be preempted by 
the FAA (quoting Brown v. Genesis Healthcare Corp., 724 S.E.2d 250, 294 (W. Va. 2011), 
vacated sub nom. Marmet Health Care Ctr., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1201)); see also Perry, 482 U.S. at 
493 n.9 (“Nor may a court rely on the uniqueness of an agreement to arbitrate as a basis for a 
state-law holding that enforcement would be unconscionable, for this would enable the court 
to effect what . . . the state legislature cannot.”). 
26. AT&T Mobility LLC, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011).  See, e.g., Hiro N. Aragaki, Equal 
Opportunity for Arbitration, 58 UCLA L. Rev. 1189, 1201, 1202 n.75 (2011); Christopher R. 
Drahozal, Federal Arbitration Act Preemption, 79 IND. L.J. 393, 408–11 (2004); David S. 
Schwartz, The Federal Arbitration Act and the Power of Congress over State Courts, 83 OR. L. 
REV. 541, 558–62, 568–70 (2004).  Legal scholars have continued to express concern about 
this issue after AT&T Mobility LLC.  See, e.g., Michael J. Yelnosky, Fully Federalizing the 
Federal Arbitration Act, 90 OR. L. REV. 729, 743–44 (2012). 
27. Williams v. Aetna Fin. Co., 700 N.E.2d 859, 865 (Ohio 1998) (“An arbitration clause 
in a contract is generally viewed as an expression that the parties agree to arbitrate 
disagreements within the scope of the arbitration clause, and, with limited exceptions, an 
arbitration clause is to be upheld just as any other provision in a contract should be 
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noted that “Ohio’s strong policy favoring arbitration is consistent with 
federal law supporting arbitration.”28  Because there is such a strong 
presumption in favor of arbitration, the Ohio Supreme Court has 
instructed that “all doubts should be resolved in its favor.”29  Other state 
courts have also echoed the principle that, because of the FAA and U.S. 
Supreme Court precedents applying that Act, there is a strong 
presumption in favor of enforcement of arbitration agreements.30 
B. The Unconscionability Doctrine 
In addition to managing the potentially complex legal issues created 
by the intersection of the FAA and general contract law, courts also 
must navigate the murky depths of the unconscionability doctrine itself.  
As discussed infra, the unconscionability doctrine’s evolution over time 
has not always resulted in clarity of terms or consistency of application.  
The result is that, even without the arbitration context, states have 
developed varying approaches to the unconscionability doctrine. 
1. The Historical and Statutory Basis of the Unconscionability Doctrine 
For purposes of this Article, it is also important to understand the 
unconscionability doctrine more generally.  The concept of 
unconscionability has roots going back to English common law.31  
Traditionally, a bargain was said to be unconscionable in an action at 
 
respected.”); see also Hayes v. Oakridge Home, 908 N.E.2d 408, 411–12 (Ohio 2009); Taylor 
Bldg. Corp. of Am. v. Benfield, 884 N.E.2d 12, 19 (Ohio 2008); Schaefer v. Allstate Ins. Co., 
590 N.E.2d 1242, 1245 (Ohio 1992) (plurality opinion). 
28. Taylor Bldg. Corp. of Am., 884 N.E.2d at 19 n.1. 
29. Hayes, 908 N.E.2d at 412 (citing Ignazio v. Clear Channel Broad., Inc., 865 N.E.2d 
18, 22 (Ohio 2007)). 
30. See, e.g., Falls v. 1CI, Inc, 57 A.3d 521, 529 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2012) (noting that 
the federal courts have interpreted the FAA to create a presumption of arbitrability); Pressler 
v. Duke Univ., 685 S.E.2d 6, 10 (N.C. Ct. App. 2009) (same); Greater Canton Ford Mercury, 
Inc. v. Ables, 948 So. 2d 417, 422 (Miss. 2007) (stating that the Mississippi Supreme Court has 
followed the U.S. Supreme Court in recognizing “the established federal policy favoring 
arbitration agreements” (citing to Terminix Int’l, Inc. v. Rice, 904 So. 2d 1051, 1055 (Miss. 
2004))); Kan. City Urology, P.A. v. United Healthcare Servs., 261 S.W.3d 7, 12 (Mo. Ct. App. 
2008) (stating that, under federal law, an arbitration clause’s “broad scope creates a strong 
presumption in favor of arbitrability”); Int’l Ass’n of Firefighters, Local No. 1285 v. City of 
Las Vegas, 929 P.2d 954, 957 (Nev. 1996) (“There is a presumption of arbitrability when a 
contract contains an arbitration clause.” (citing Int’l Ass’n of Firefighters, Local No. 1285 v. 
City of Las Vegas, 764 P.2d 478, 480–81 (Nev. 1988))). 
31. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208 cmt. b (1981) (quoting Hume v. 
United States, 132 U.S. 406, 411 (1889) (quoting Earl of Chesterfield v. Janssen, (1750) 28 
Eng. Rep. 82 (Ch.) 100; 2 Ves. Sen. 125, 155)). 
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law if it was “such as no man in his senses and not under delusion would 
make on the one hand, and as no honest and fair man would accept on 
the other.”32  Thus, historically, courts recognized unconscionability as a 
defense to a claim for breach of contract.33  However, courts have been 
more likely to find a contract unconscionable during the past century 
than before the twentieth century.34 
The unconscionability doctrine was ultimately codified in the 
Uniform Commercial Code (UCC).35  All of the states which are 
included in this study have adopted the UCC and, specifically, the 
unconscionability provision.36  Although the UCC unconscionability 
doctrine applies specifically to contracts for the sale and lease of goods, 
courts have extended the doctrine to other types of contracts as well.37  
Moreover, state legislatures have also passed other unconscionability 
statutes over time, such as those addressing unconscionable provisions 
 
32. Hume, 132 U.S. at 411 (quoting Earl of Chesterfield, 28 Eng. Rep. at 100; 2 Ves. Sen. 
at 155).  Missouri courts have referenced this definition from Hume.  See, e.g., Swain v. Auto 
Servs., Inc., 128 S.W.3d 103, 108 (Mo. Ct. App. 2003) (quoting Hume, 132 U.S. at 415).  In 
another case, the Missouri Supreme Court stated that unconscionability is “an inequality so 
strong, gross, and manifest that it must be impossible to state it to one with common sense 
without producing an exclamation at the inequity of it.”  Mo. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., Div. of 
Aging v. Brookside Nursing Ctr., Inc., 50 S.W.3d 273, 277 (Mo. 2001) (en banc) (quoting 
Peirick v. Peirick, 641 S.W.2d 195, 197 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982)) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
33. 8 SAMUEL WILLISTON & RICHARD A. LORD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF 
CONTRACTS § 18:1 (4th ed. 2010). 
34. See Scott R. Peppet, Freedom of Contract in an Augmented Reality: The Case of 
Consumer Contracts, 59 UCLA L. REV. 676, 708–09 (2012) (“[M]odern courts are more likely 
than their classical predecessors to question, alter, or reject a contract’s written terms on 
grounds of unconscionability or unfair surprise.”); see also Knapp, supra note 4, at 612–13 
(describing how the unconscionability doctrine saw the most use in the period after states’ 
adoption of the UCC, before undergoing “a decade or two of relative dormancy” beginning in 
the 1970s). 
35. U.C.C. § 2-302 & cmt. 1 (2012–2013); see also 8 WILLISTON & LORD, supra note 33, 
§ 18:1. 
36. See ALASKA STAT. § 45.02.302 (2012); ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-2-302 (2001); COLO. 
REV. STAT. § 4-2-302 (2013); 810 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/2-302 (West 2009); ME. REV. 
STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 2-302 (1995); MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW § 2-302 (LexisNexis 2002); 
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 336.2-302 (West 2002); MISS. CODE ANN. § 75-2-302 (2002); MO. ANN. 
STAT. § 400.2-302 (West 1994); MONT. CODE ANN. § 30-2-302 (2013); NEB. REV. STAT. § 2-
302 (2001); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 104.2302 (LexisNexis 2013); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§ 382-A:2-302 (2011); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 55-2-302 (1993); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-2-302 (2011); 
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1302.15 (LexisNexis 2012); OR. REV. STAT. § 72.3020 (2013); R.I. 
GEN. LAWS § 6A-2-302 (2001); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-2-302 (2003); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9A, 
§ 2-302 (2011). 
37. 8 WILLISTON & LORD, supra note 33, § 18:5. 
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in residential leases or other types of agreements.38  Regardless of the 
widespread adoption of the unconscionability doctrine, however, one of 
the challenges that courts face is the fact that the UCC does not define 
what makes a contract “unconscionable.”39  Instead, the Official 
Comment to UCC section 302 provides the following basic test: 
“[W]hether, in the light of the general commercial background and the 
commercial needs of the particular trade or case, the clauses involved 
are so one-sided as to be unconscionable under the circumstances 
existing at the time of the making of the contract.”40 The result of this 
vague instruction is that courts are left with significant latitude in 
applying the doctrine to specific contracts.41 
 
38. See, e.g., NEB. REV. STAT. § 76-2717 (2009) (unconscionability and foreclosure 
consulting contracts); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 104A.2108 (unconscionability and lease 
provisions); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 118A.230 (LexisNexis 2010) (unconscionability and 
rental agreements); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25A-43 (unconscionability and retail installment sales 
contracts); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1310.06 (unconscionability and lease contracts); OHIO 
REV. CODE ANN. § 4781.48 (LexisNexis 2013) (unconscionability and rental agreements); 
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5321.14 (LexisNexis 2004) (unconscionability and rental 
agreements); OR. REV. STAT. § 72A.1080 (unconscionability and lease provisions); OR. REV. 
STAT. § 90.135 (unconscionability and residential leases); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 6A-2.1-108 
(unconscionability and lease contracts); S.C. CODE ANN. § 37-4-106 (2002) (unconscionability 
and insurance contracts). 
39. See 8 WILLISTON & LORD, supra note 33, §§ 18:8, 18:11; Randall, supra note 4, at 194 
(observing that “[u]nconscionability is an open-ended, undefined concept subject to judicial 
definition case-by-case”).  The lack of definition has historically led to some criticism about 
the application of the unconscionability doctrine to individual cases, both before and after 
courts began to apply the doctrine to arbitration agreements.  See generally Carol B. Swanson, 
Unconscionable Quandary: UCC Article 2 and the Unconscionability Doctrine, 31 N.M. L. 
REV. 359 (2001); see also Evelyn L. Brown, The Uncertainty of U.C.C. Section 2-302: Why 
Unconscionability Has Become a Relic, 105 COM. L.J. 287, 288 (2000) (complaining that the 
unconscionability doctrine gives courts “wide latitude,” which they may “manipulate . . . in 
order to reach the equitable results they desire”); Arthur Allen Leff, Unconscionability and 
the Code—The Emperor’s New Clause, 115 U. PA. L. REV. 485, 488 (1967) (describing the 
difficulties in defining and applying the unconscionability doctrine in light of section 2-302 of 
the Uniform Commercial Code’s “amorphous unintelligibility”); John A. Spanogle, Jr., 
Analyzing Unconscionability Problems, 117 U. PA. L. REV. 931, 931 (1969) (“The primary 
problem with [the unconscionability doctrine] is that the concept of unconscionability is 
vague, so that neither courts, practicing attorneys, nor contract draftsmen can be certain of its 
applicability in any particular situation.”).  Moreover, Professor Charles Fried has criticized 
the unconscionability doctrine as paternalistic and inconsistent with the concept of 
contractual obligation.  See Charles Fried, Contract as Promise Thirty Years On, 45 SUFFOLK 
U. L. REV. 961, 976 (2012); cf. Seana Valentine Shiffrin, Paternalism, Unconscionability 
Doctrine, and Accommodation, 29 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 205, 205–06 (2000) (describing some 
examples where the unconscionability doctrine may be applied in a paternalistic manner but 
concluding that not all examples are paternalistic). 
40. U.C.C. § 2-302 cmt. 1. 
41. 8 WILLISTON & LORD, supra note 33, § 18:8. 
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Some states’ statutes may also provide additional guidance regarding 
the application of the unconscionability doctrine.  For instance, the 
statutes in the states that are part of this study make clear that the courts 
are to look to the circumstances at the time of contract formation to 
determine whether the contract is unconscionable, not the 
circumstances at the time that one party seeks to enforce the contract or 
another seeks to avoid it.42  Furthermore, depending on the state, if a 
court finds the challenged contract provisions to be unconscionable, the 
court may have the latitude to choose from several possible statutory 
remedies.  For example, the court may (1) refuse to enforce the 
contract; (2) excise the unconscionable clause and enforce the 
remainder of the contract; or (3) “so limit the application of any 
unconscionable clause as to avoid any unconscionable result.”43  Finally, 
in cases where a party argues unconscionability, some states’ statutes 
specifically direct the courts to give the parties “a reasonable 
opportunity to present evidence as to [the contract’s] commercial 
setting, purpose, and effect to aid the court in making the 
[unconscionability] determination.”44  Some courts have interpreted this 
type of statutory provision to require an evidentiary hearing for 
 
42. See ALASKA STAT. § 45.02.302(a) (2012); ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-2-302(1) (2001); 
COLO. REV. STAT. § 4-2-302(1) (2013); 810 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/2-302(1) (West 2009); 
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 2-302(1) (1995); MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW § 2-302(1) 
(LexisNexis 2002); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 336.2-302(1) (West 2002); MISS. CODE ANN. § 75-2-
302(1) (2002); MO. ANN. STAT. § 400.2-302(1) (West 1994); MONT. CODE ANN. § 30-2-302(1) 
(2013); NEB. REV. STAT. § 2-302(1) (2001); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 104.2302(1) (LexisNexis 
2013); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 382-A:2-302(1) (2011); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 55-2-302(1) 
(1993); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-2-302(1); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1302.15(A) (LexisNexis 
2012); OR. REV. STAT. § 72.3020(1); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 6A-2-302(1); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-2-
302(1) (2003); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9A, § 2-302(1) (2011). 
43. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1302.15(A); see also ALASKA STAT. § 45.02.302(a); ARK. 
CODE ANN. § 4-2-302(1); COLO. REV. STAT. § 4-2-302(1); 810 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/2-
302(1); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 2-302(1); MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW § 2-302(1); 
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 336.2-302(1); MISS. CODE ANN. § 75-2-302(1); MO. ANN. STAT. § 400.2-
302(1); MONT. CODE ANN. § 30-2-302(1); NEB. REV. STAT. § 2-302(1); NEV. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 104.2302(1); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 382-A:2-302(1); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 55-2-302(1); 
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-2-302(1); OR. REV. STAT. § 72.3020(1); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 6A-2-302(1); 
S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-2-302(1); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9A, § 2-302(1). 
44. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1302.15(B); see also ALASKA STAT. § 45.02.302(b); ARK. 
CODE ANN. § 4-2-302(2); COLO. REV. STAT. § 4-2-302(2); 810 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/2-
302(2); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 2-302(2); MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW § 2-302(2); 
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 336.2-302(2); MISS. CODE ANN. § 75-2-302(2); MO. ANN. STAT. § 400.2-
302(2); MONT. CODE ANN. § 30-2-302(2); NEB. REV. STAT. § 2-302(2); NEV. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 104.2302(2); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 382-A:2-302(2); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 55-2-302(2); 
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-2-302(2); OR. REV. STAT. § 72.3020(2); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 6A-2-302(2); 
S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-2-302(2); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9A, § 2-302(2). 
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unconscionability issues, or at least a specific opportunity for parties to 
present evidence regarding the alleged unconscionability and to respond 
to the opposing party’s submissions.45 
A state court’s application of the state’s unconscionability statutes 
may be affected by other statutes as well.  For example, if the contract at 
issue is a consumer contract, some states have consumer protection laws 
that may interact with the court’s unconscionability analysis to create 
another layer of complexity.46  Aside from the FAA, other federal laws 
may also affect state courts’ unconscionability analysis.47  Thus, the 
Nevada Supreme Court recently held that, in the healthcare contract 
context, the Federal Medicare Act can preempt Nevada’s 
unconscionability law.48  The Nebraska Supreme Court recently 
determined that its unconscionability analysis of an arbitration 
agreement, which was part of a crop insurance contract, was governed 
not only by state law governing insurance contracts and the FAA, but 
also by the McCarran-Ferguson Act49 and federal regulations related to 
 
45. See, e.g., Hollingshead v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc., 920 N.E.2d 1254, 1261–62 (Ill. 
App. Ct. 2009) (holding that, “absent an evidentiary hearing, the circuit court could not have 
found the arbitration provisions at issue to be procedurally unconscionable based on the 
allegations of the complaint standing alone”); Bargman v. Skilled Healthcare Grp., Inc., 292 
P.3d 1, 6 (N.M. Ct. App. 2012) (remanding to the trial court for an evidentiary hearing 
regarding whether a challenged contract provision was substantively unconscionable); Olah v. 
Ganley Chevrolet, Inc., 2006-Ohio-694, ¶ 29 (Ct. App.) (“[W]hen the circumstances of the 
sale are not developed sufficiently in the record to ascertain unconscionability, the trial court 
should conduct a hearing to decide the issue.” (citing Molina v. Ponsky, 2005-Ohio-6349, ¶ 18 
(Ct. App.))); cf. Moran v. Riverfront Diversified, Inc., 968 N.E.2d 1, 5 (Ohio Ct. App. 2011) 
(holding that the trial court did not commit reversible error by failing to hold an evidentiary 
hearing on the unconscionability argument, when both parties submitted affidavits in support 
of their written arguments and, thus, had been heard). 
46. See, for example, the Ohio Consumer Sales Practices Act, OHIO REV. CODE ANN. 
§§ 1345.01–1345.13 (LexisNexis 2012 & Supp. 2013), and cases discussing the intersection 
between the Ohio Consumer Sales Practices Act and unconscionability, Bozich v. Kozusko, 
2009-Ohio-6908, ¶¶ 14–20 (Ct. App.); Eagle v. Fred Martin Motor Co., 809 N.E.2d 1161, 
1169–70 (Ohio Ct. App. 2004); see also Ramette v. AT&T Corp., 812 N.E.2d 504, 507 (Ill. 
App. Ct. 2004) (reviewing customer asserted claims of unconscionability and violations of 
Illinois’ Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act); and Munoz v. Green Tree 
Fin. Corp., 542 S.E.2d 360, 364 (S.C. 2001) (discussing intersection between the FAA and 
South Carolina’s Consumer Protection Code). 
47. For a recently-published analysis of the intersection between the FAA and the 
National Labor Relations Act, see generally Charles A. Sullivan & Timothy P. Glynn, Horton 
Hatches the Egg: Concerted Action Includes Concerted Dispute Resolution, 64 ALA. L. REV. 
1013 (2013). 
48. See Pacificare of Nev., Inc. v. Rogers, 266 P.3d 596, 601 (Nev. 2011); Pacificare of 
Nev., Inc. v. Meana, No. 55754, 2011 WL 5146064 (Nev. Oct. 27, 2011). 
49. McCarran-Ferguson Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011–15 (2012).  Under the McCarran-
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the Federal Crop Insurance Act.50  Finally, an Illinois appellate court 
held that a consumer’s unconscionability claim—regarding the 
arbitration clause in a long-distance telephone carrier’s service 
agreement—was preempted by the Federal Communications Act.51 
Moreover, although none of the states in this study have statutes that 
specifically address unconscionability in the context of arbitration 
agreements, in keeping with U.S. Supreme Court precedent and other 
cases interpreting the FAA, almost all of the twenty states do have 
statutes that make it clear that, generally, arbitration agreements are to 
be held to the same legal standards as other types of contracts.52  The 
case law language in these states also echoes this theme, regardless of 
how each state’s courts actually apply the unconscionability doctrine.53 
 
Ferguson Act, “state law regulating the business of insurance preempts federal law that does 
not specifically govern insurance.”  Kremer v. Rural Cmty. Ins. Co., 788 N.W.2d 538, 550 
(Neb. 2010). 
50. Federal Crop Insurance Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 1501–24 (2012).  See generally Kremer, 788 
N.W.2d 538. 
51. Ramette, 812 N.E.2d at 513–14. 
52. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2711.01(A) (LexisNexis 2008).  That statute 
provides: 
A provision in any written contract . . . to settle by arbitration a controversy that 
subsequently arises out of the contract, or out of the refusal to perform the whole or 
any part of the contract, or any agreement in writing between two or more persons 
to submit to arbitration any controversy existing between them at the time of the 
agreement to submit, or arising after the agreement to submit, from a relationship 
then existing between them or that they simultaneously create, shall be valid, 
irrevocable, and enforceable, except upon grounds that exist at law or in equity for the 
revocation of any contract. 
Id. (emphasis added); see also ALASKA STAT. §§ 09.43.010(a), 09.43.330(a) (2012); ARK. 
CODE ANN. § 16-108-206(a) (Supp. 2013); COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-22-206(1) (2013); 710 ILL. 
COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/1 (West 2007); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 5927 (2003); MD. CODE 
ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 3-206(a) (LexisNexis 2006 & Supp. 2012); MINN. STAT. ANN. 
§ 572B.06(a) (West Supp. 2014); MO. ANN. STAT. § 435.350 (West 2010); MONT. CODE ANN. 
§ 27-5-114(1) (2013); NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-2602.01(a) (2008); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§ 38.219(1) (LexisNexis 2012 & Supp. 2013); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 542:1 (2007); N.M. 
STAT. ANN. § 44-7A-7(a) (2007); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-569.6(a) (2011); OR. REV. STAT. 
§§ 36.454(5), 36.620(1) (2013); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 10-3-2 (2012); S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-48-
10(a) (2005); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 5652(a) (2002).  Mississippi does not have an 
equivalent statute. 
53. See, e.g., Raper v. Oliver House, LLC, 637 S.E.2d 551, 554 (N.C. Ct. App. 2006) 
(“The essential thrust of the Federal Arbitration Act, which is in accord with the law of our 
state, is to require the application of contract law to determine whether a particular 
arbitration agreement is enforceable . . . .” (quoting Futrelle v. Duke Univ., 488 S.E.2d 635, 
638 (N.C. Ct. App. 1997)) (internal quotation marks omitted)); Taylor Bldg. Corp. of Am. v. 
Benfield, 884 N.E.2d 12, 20 (Ohio 2008) (“Arbitration agreements are ‘valid, irrevocable, and 
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2. Procedural Unconscionability and Substantive Unconscionability 
There are two types of unconscionability: procedural 
unconscionability and substantive unconscionability.  Most states’ 
unconscionability doctrines require both procedural unconscionability 
and substantive unconscionability before a court will refuse to enforce a 
contract.54  For example, the Ohio Supreme Court has summarized 
unconscionability as including both “an absence of meaningful choice on 
the part of one of the parties together with contract terms which are 
unreasonably favorable to the other party.”55  However, a minority of 
state courts do not require both procedural unconscionability and 
substantive unconscionability in order to invalidate a contract on 
unconscionability grounds.56  Some states use a sliding scale approach, 
 
enforceable, except upon grounds that exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any 
contract.’” (quoting OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2711.01(A) (LexisNexis 1992))). 
54. See 8 WILLISTON & LORD, supra note 33, §§ 18:9–10.  See, e.g., Freedman v. 
Comcast Corp., 988 A.2d 68, 85 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2010) (“The prevailing view is that both 
procedural and substantive unconscionability must be present in order for a court to 
invalidate a contractual term as unconscionable.” (citing Doyle v. Fin. Am., LLC, 918 A.2d 
1266, 1274 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2007))); Burch v. Second Jud. Dist. Ct., 49 P.3d 647, 650 (Nev. 
2002); Hayes v. Oakridge Home, 908 N.E.2d 408, 412 (Ohio 2009) (stating that a “quantum” 
of both procedural and substantive unconscionability must be established in order for a 
provision to be unconscionable (citing Collins v. Click Camera & Video, Inc., 621 N.E.2d 
1294, 1299 (Ohio Ct. App. 1993))).  However, Nebraska’s case law suggests that, outside of 
the commercial context, Nebraska courts may not require both substantive and procedural 
unconscionability.  See Myers v. Neb. Inv. Council, 724 N.W.2d 776, 799 (Neb. 2006) (citing 
Adams v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 498 N.W.2d 577, 590 (Neb. Ct. App. 1992)). 
55. Hayes, 908 N.E.2d at 412 (quoting Lake Ridge Acad. v. Carney, 613 N.E.2d 183, 189 
(Ohio 1993)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
56. For example, Vermont courts do not require procedural unconscionability to find a 
contract provision unconscionable.  See Glassford v. BrickKicker, 35 A.3d 1044, 1049 (Vt. 
2011).  Although Illinois courts appear to have required both procedural and substantive 
unconscionability in the past, see Zobrist v. Verizon Wireless, 822 N.E.2d 531, 540 (Ill. App. 
Ct. 2004), in Kinkel v. Cingular Wireless LLC, 857 N.E.2d 250 (Ill. 2006), the Illinois Supreme 
Court held that a finding of unconscionability can be based upon procedural 
unconscionability, substantive unconscionability, or both.  Kinkel, 857 N.E.2d at 263 (citing 
Razor v. Hyundai Motor Am., 854 N.E.2d 607, 622 (Ill. 2006)).  Missouri courts also appear to 
not require both procedural and substantive unconscionability.  See Ruhl v. Lee’s Summit 
Honda, 322 S.W.3d 136, 139 n.2 (Mo. 2010) (“[U]nconscionability can be procedural, 
substantive, or a combination of both.  There is no need in all cases to show both aspects of 
unconscionability.”).  The New Mexico Supreme Court has also suggested that both 
substantive unconscionability and procedural unconscionability are not required.  See 
Cordova v. World Fin. Corp. of N.M., 208 P.3d 901, 908 (N.M. 2009) (holding that, “[w]hile 
there is a greater likelihood of a contract’s being invalidated for unconscionability if there is a 
combination of both procedural and substantive unconscionability, there is no absolute 
requirement in our law that both must be present to the same degree or that they both be 
present at all”). 
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such that if there is a significant amount of substantive 
unconscionability, less procedural unconscionability is required.57 
Procedural unconscionability refers to the making of the contract as 
opposed to the substance of the contract.58  Therefore, in determining 
whether procedural unconscionability exists, courts often consider, 
among numerous factors: (1) whether there was a meeting of the minds 
as to the formation of the agreement;59 (2) the experience, intelligence, 
age, and education of the parties;60 (3) the parties’ relative bargaining 
 
57. See E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS § 4.28, at 302 (4th ed. 
2004).  States that have appeared to advocate a sliding scale approach to unconscionability 
analysis include Illinois, Nevada, New Mexico, and North Carolina.  See, e.g., Razor, 854 
N.E.2d at 622; Gonski v. Second Jud. Dist. Ct., 245 P.3d 1164, 1169–70 (Nev. 2010) 
(“Although a showing of both types of unconscionability is necessary before an arbitration 
clause will be invalidated, . . . a strong showing of procedural unconscionability mean[s] that 
less substantive unconscionability [is] required.” (citing D.R. Horton, Inc. v. Green, 96 P.3d 
1159, 1162 (Nev. 2004))); Cordova, 208 P.3d at 908; Tillman v. Commercial Credit Loans, Inc., 
655 S.E.2d 362, 370 (N.C. 2008).  Professor Melissa Lonegrass, in particular, has advocated 
the use of a sliding scale approach to the unconscionability doctrine.  See generally Melissa T. 
Lonegrass, Finding Room for Fairness in Formalism—The Sliding Scale Approach to 
Unconscionability, 44 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 1 (2012). 
58. See, e.g., Freedman, 988 A.2d at 85 (“Procedural unconscionability ‘deals with the 
process of making a contract . . . .” (quoting Walther v. Sovereign Bank, 872 A.2d 735, 744 
(Md. 2005)) (internal quotation mark omitted)); Shaffer v. Royal Gate Dodge, Inc., 300 
S.W.3d 556, 559 (Mo. Ct. App. 2009).  Alternatively, Professor Arthur Allen Leff once 
defined procedural unconscionability as “bargaining naughtiness.”  Leff, supra note 39, at 
487. 
59. See, e.g., Brewer v. Mo. Title Loans, 364 S.W.3d 486, 500 (Mo. 2012) (en banc) 
(Price, J., dissenting) (stating that “[p]rocedural unconscionability . . . deals with the 
formalities of making the contract and focuses on whether the parties had a voluntary and 
sufficient meeting of the minds to bind each other to the terms of the writing”); Wascovich v. 
Personacare of Ohio, Inc., 943 N.E.2d 1030, 1035 (Ohio Ct. App. 2010) (explaining that 
“[p]rocedural unconscionability concerns the formation of the agreement and occurs when no 
voluntary meeting of the minds is possible” (quoting Porpora v. Gatliff Bldg. Co., 828 N.E.2d 
1081, 1083 (Ohio Ct. App. 2005)) (internal quotation marks omitted)); Dan Ryan Builders, 
Inc. v. Nelson, 737 S.E.2d 550, 558 (W. Va. 2012) (stating that “[p]rocedural unconscionability 
arises from inequities, improprieties, or unfairness in the bargaining process and the 
formation of the contract, inadequacies that suggest a lack of a real and voluntary meeting of 
the minds of the parties”). 
60. See Moran v. Riverfront Diversified, Inc., 968 N.E.2d 1, 6 (Ohio Ct. App. 2011) 
(noting that, in determining whether a contract is procedurally unconscionable, the 
“[r]elevant considerations include the parties’ age, education, intelligence, [and] business 
acumen and experience”); Motsinger v. Lithia Rose-FT, Inc., 156 P.3d 156, 161 (Or. Ct. App. 
2007) (noting that evidence of the parties’ unequal bargaining power was insufficient to 
demonstrate that a contract was procedurally unconscionable, where there was “no evidence 
that the depositors were not of ordinary experience and intelligence” (citing Best v. U.S. Nat’l 
Bank of Or., 739 P.2d 554, 556 (Or. 1987))); cf. Hollingshead v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc., 
920 N.E.2d 1254, 1261 (Ill. App. Ct. 2009) (holding that procedural unconscionability was not 
established where plaintiff failed to present circumstances surrounding the making of the 
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power and whether there was the presence or absence of meaningful 
choice on the part of the weaker party;61 (4) the conspicuousness and 
clarity of the contract terms and whether attention was drawn to the 
challenged terms when the agreement was signed;62 and (5) whether the 
party challenging the agreement was represented by counsel when the 
agreement was signed.63  Although a court may ultimately determine 
that a contract of adhesion is procedurally unconscionable, most state 
courts have held that a contract of adhesion is not per se 
unconscionable.64 
In contrast to procedural unconscionability, substantive 
unconscionability refers to the contract’s specific terms.65  A contract 
may be substantively unconscionable if it includes harsh, one-sided, or 
oppressive terms.66  Just as in their procedural unconscionability 
 
agreement aside from the signatory’s advanced age). 
61. See, e.g., Freedman, 988 A.2d at 85; Manfredi v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Kan. 
City, 340 S.W.3d 126, 132–33 (Mo. Ct. App. 2011); D.R. Horton, Inc., 96 P.3d at 1162–63; 
Westmoreland v. High Point Healthcare Inc., 721 S.E.2d 712, 717 (N.C. Ct. App. 2012); 
Williams v. Aetna Fin. Co., 700 N.E.2d 859, 866–67 (Ohio 1998). 
62. See, e.g., Freedman, 988 A.2d at 86; D.R. Horton, Inc., 96 P.3d at 1162, 1164; Tillman, 
655 S.E.2d at 370; Porpora, 828 N.E.2d at 1084–85; Small v. HCF of Perrysburg, Inc., 823 
N.E.2d 19, 23 (Ohio Ct. App. 2004); Eagle v. Fred Martin Motor Co., 809 N.E.2d 1161, 1177–
78, 1180 (Ohio Ct. App. 2004). 
63. See, e.g., Porpora, 828 N.E.2d at 1084; Small, 823 N.E.2d at 24; Eagle, 809 N.E.2d at 
1180; cf. Westmoreland, 721 S.E.2d at 718 (holding that an arbitration agreement was not 
procedurally unconscionable where the contract “affirmatively advise[d] a party to seek legal 
advice or to consult with the admissions coordinator if she [had] any questions” about the 
terms of the agreement). 
64. See, e.g., Walther v. Sovereign Bank, 872 A.2d 735, 746 (Md. 2005) (holding that “[a] 
contract of adhesion is not automatically deemed per se unconscionable”); Westmoreland, 721 
S.E.2d at 717 (“An imbalance in bargaining strength is one of many factors that must be 
considered to determine whether there is procedural unconscionability.  But bargaining 
inequity alone generally cannot establish procedural unconscionability.” (internal citation 
omitted) (citing Tillman, 655 S.E.2d at 370)); Taylor Bldg. Corp. of Am. v. Benfield, 884 
N.E.2d 12, 24 (Ohio 2008) (“To be sure, an arbitration clause in a consumer contract with 
some characteristics of an adhesion contract ‘necessarily engenders more reservations than an 
arbitration clause in a different setting,’ such as in a collective-bargaining agreement or a 
commercial contract between two businesses.  However, even a contract of adhesion is not in 
all instances unconscionable per se.” (emphasis added) (internal citation omitted) (quoting 
Williams, 700 N.E.2d at 866)). 
65. See, e.g., Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Rosen, 949 N.E.2d 639, 647 (Ill. 2011); Livingston v. 
Metro. Pediatrics, LLC, 227 P.3d 796, 806 (Or. Ct. App. 2010); Rivera v. Am. Gen. Fin. 
Servs., Inc., 259 P.3d 803, 817 (N.M. 2011) (“Substantive unconscionability concerns the 
legality and fairness of the contract terms themselves . . . .” (quoting Cordova v. World Fin. 
Corp. of N.M., 208 P.3d 901, 907 (N.M. 2009))). 
66. See Phoenix Ins. Co., 949 N.E.2d at 647; Manfredi, 340 S.W.3d at 132, 134; Rivera, 
259 P.3d at 817 (citing Cordova, 208 P.3d 901); Westmoreland, 721 S.E.2d at 719. 
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analysis, courts are ordinarily unwilling to declare terms to be per se 
substantively unconscionable, instead analyzing challenged contract 
terms in light of the individual circumstances of each case.67 
With respect to arbitration agreements specifically, courts disfavor 
arbitration provisions that are one-sided and have the effect of 
benefiting one party much more than the other.68  However, although 
courts will often closely scrutinize a contract that has one-sided contract 
provisions, especially in the context of consumer contracts, they do not 
normally require that contract provisions equally benefit the parties.69  
Courts have also carefully weighed provisions that prevent the plaintiffs 
from seeking the same remedies that would be available in court, 
particularly if there are specific statutory rights involved.70  
Unreasonable or prohibitively high arbitration costs have been another 
justification for finding an arbitration provision substantively 
unconscionable.71  In considering whether a contract provision is 
 
67. See, e.g., Tillman, 655 S.E.2d at 371–72; Livingston, 227 P.3d at 807. 
68. Manfredi, 340 S.W.3d at 134–35 (holding that arbitration agreement provisions, 
which allowed the defendant to “unilaterally revise the arbitration rules, render the arbitrator 
powerless to resolve a large class of claims, or fail to provide an adequate remedy for the 
dispute,” were substantively unconscionable); Tillman, 655 S.E.2d at 372–73 (holding that an 
arbitration agreement was substantively unconscionable in part because the agreement 
exempted foreclosure actions and claims of less than $15,000, which unfairly benefited the 
defendant); Williams, 700 N.E.2d at 866; Porpora, 828 N.E.2d at 1085. 
69. See, e.g., Walther, 872 A.2d at 748 (holding that arbitration agreement in mortgage 
agreement did not lack mutuality even though agreement allowed mortgage company to 
bring foreclosure actions in court); Motsinger v. Lithia Rose-FT, Inc., 156 P.3d 156, 164 (Or. 
Ct. App. 2007) (concluding that “an approach that focuses on the one-sided effect of an 
arbitration clause—rather than on its one-sided application—to evaluate substantive 
unconscionability is most consistent with the common law in Oregon regarding 
unconscionability of other kinds of contractual provisions and with state and federal policies 
regarding arbitration”). 
70. See, e.g., Gonski v. Second Jud. Dist. Ct., 245 P.3d 1164, 1171–72 (Nev. 2010) 
(holding that the arbitration agreement was unconscionable where it impermissibly waived 
most statutory protections regarding residential construction defects); Hayes v. Oakridge 
Home, 886 N.E.2d 928, 930, 932 (Ohio Ct. App. 2008), rev’d, 908 N.E.2d 408 (Ohio 2009); 
Eagle v. Fred Martin Motor Co., 809 N.E.2d 1161, 1175 (Ohio Ct. App. 2004). 
71. See Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 90–91 (2000) (observing that 
“the existence of large arbitration costs” might serve as a basis for a determination that an 
arbitration agreement was unenforceable); see also Tillman, 655 S.E.2d at 371–72 (holding 
that the arbitration agreement, which stated that the loser would bear the costs of any 
arbitration lasting more than eight hours, was substantively unconscionable where the 
evidence showed that the plaintiff had limited financial resources and a two-day arbitration 
hearing would cost several thousand dollars); Vasquez-Lopez v. Beneficial Or., Inc., 152 P.3d 
940, 952 (Or. Ct. App. 2007) (holding that an arbitration agreement’s cost-sharing provision 
was “sufficiently onerous to act as a deterrent to [the] plaintiffs’ vindication of their claim”); 
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substantively unconscionable, Ohio courts may evaluate the challenged 
provision’s commercial reasonableness.72  Finally, courts are more likely 
to find arbitration agreements substantively unconscionable if the 
agreements do not provide enough information about the arbitration 
process.73 
III. THE SCHOLARLY DEBATE REGARDING HOW STATE COURTS 
APPLY THE UNCONSCIONABILITY DOCTRINE 
As introduced supra, much has been written about how state courts 
apply the unconscionability doctrine to arbitration agreements, with 
many scholars critical of state courts’ purportedly uneven approach.74  
This critique has been echoed by federal courts, especially the U.S. 
Supreme Court.75  These concerns about uneven application of the 
unconscionability doctrine provide a good starting point for this long-
term study and, thus, merit some further discussion. 
California has drawn the most attention, in part because of empirical 
research by Stephen A. Broome76 and Susan Randall,77 and in part 
because of the U.S. Supreme Court’s 2011 decision in AT&T Mobility 
LLC.78  Broome’s study analyzed the unconscionability case law of the 
California courts of appeal, the state’s intermediate appellate courts, for 
the time period from August 27, 1982, the date of the first case adopting 
a “modern” approach to the unconscionability doctrine, to January 26, 
2006.79  In all, Broome analyzed a total of 160 cases, including 114 cases 
in which there was an unconscionability challenge to an arbitration 
 
cf. Westmoreland, 721 S.E.2d at 722 (determining that the trial court erred in finding an 
arbitration agreement’s cost-shifting provision unconscionable where the plaintiff did not 
present evidence of arbitration costs or comparisons between the costs of arbitrating versus 
litigating her claims). 
72. See, e.g., Collins v. Click Camera & Video, Inc., 621 N.E.2d 1294, 1299 (Ohio Ct. 
App. 1993). 
73. See, e.g., Felix v. Ganley Chevrolet, Inc., 2006-Ohio-4500, ¶ 22 (Ct. App.). 
74. See supra note 4. 
75. See, e.g., AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1747 (2011) (noting 
that California courts are more likely to find an arbitration agreement unconscionable than 
other types of contracts). 
76. See generally Broome, supra note 4. 
77. See generally Randall, supra note 4. 
78. See generally AT&T Mobility LLC, 131 S. Ct. 1740. 
79. Broome, supra note 4, at 44 n.33 (citing A&M Produce Co. v. FMC Corp., 186 Cal. 
Rptr. 114, 121–22 (Cal. Ct. App. 1982)).  Broome defined the “modern” approach to the 
unconscionability doctrine as one that requires a showing of both procedural and substantive 
unconscionability.  See id. 
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agreement and forty-six cases involving unconscionability challenges to 
non-arbitration contract provisions.80 
Having done the math, Broome concluded that “unconscionability 
challenges before the California appellate courts succeed with far 
greater frequency when the contractual provision at issue is an 
arbitration agreement.”81  Specifically, he determined that California 
courts of appeal found arbitration provisions unconscionable in fifty-
eight percent of cases but only held non-arbitration contract provisions 
unconscionable eleven percent of the time.82  Although Broome’s study 
is useful in understanding California courts’ application of the 
unconscionability doctrine, its narrow focus on one state prevents it 
from contributing to a broader understanding of state courts’ 
unconscionability analysis. 
Professor Randall took a different approach than Broome, analyzing 
all states’ approaches to unconscionability in the arbitration context, but 
limiting her study to a comparison of two two-year time periods, 1982 to 
1983 and 2002 to 2003.83  Randall asserted that as of 2004, the date that 
her article was written, “judges [found] arbitration agreements 
unconscionable at twice the rate of non-arbitration agreements.”84  In 
comparison, she determined that twenty years earlier, judges found 
arbitration and non-arbitration contract provisions unconscionable at 
the same rate.85  Specifically, Randall argued that judges found forum 
selection clauses, confidentiality requirements, and punitive damages 
limitations unconscionable in arbitration agreements, but they would 
routinely find them unobjectionable in contracts that did not have 
arbitration clauses.86 
Randall acknowledged that a “significant number” of the cases that 
she relied on were decided by state and federal courts in California, but 
she determined that a total of seventeen different state courts found 
arbitration agreements unconscionable between 2002 and 2003.87  
 
80. Id. at 44–47. 
81. Id. at 40. 
82. Id. at 48. 
83. Randall, supra note 4, at 187. 
84. Id. at 186. 
85. Id. 
86. Id. 
87. Id. at 194–95.  Those state courts included Alabama, California, Florida, Idaho, 
Kentucky, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Mississippi, Missouri, New Mexico, Nevada, Ohio, 
Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Texas, Washington, and West Virginia.  Id. at 195 n.35. 
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Although Randall recognized that a number of factors could be 
responsible, at least in part, for the increased number of cases involving 
unconscionable arbitration agreements—such as increases in the 
number of cases generally and escalating aggressiveness in the drafting 
of arbitration agreements—she argued that “increased judicial 
willingness to find unconscionability in arbitration agreements 
suggest[ed] a latent judicial hostility to arbitration and use of 
unconscionability contrary to the Federal Arbitration Act’s mandate.”88 
Like Broome’s study of the California appellate courts’ 
unconscionability case law, Randall’s study also makes important 
contributions to a fuller understanding of how state courts apply the 
unconscionability doctrine.  Because Randall does not focus on just one 
state, her study suggests a larger problem with the uneven application of 
the unconscionability doctrine to arbitration agreements versus other 
types of contracts.89  One of the study’s limitations, however, is its very 
narrow date range.90  By focusing on two such limited time spans, it is 
difficult to conclude if the patterns that she observed hold true for the 
long term. 
Most recently, contracts scholar Charles L. Knapp conducted the 
largest scale study of unconscionability cases, although his study is still 
too cursory to come to many broader conclusions.91  Knapp conducted a 
survey of published state and federal case law in which contract 
unconscionability was an issue, covering the time period from 1990 
through 2008.92  Similar to some of Randall’s observations, Knapp noted 
as a general trend that the number of unconscionability cases has 
increased in terms of absolute numbers since 1990, although that 
increase was due for the most part to an increase in unconscionability 
arguments related to arbitration agreements.93  Moreover, he noted a 
significant increase in the “success” of unconscionability arguments 
during that time period, due almost entirely to cases involving 
arbitration agreements.94 
Echoing Broome’s conclusions, Knapp found that unconscionability 
claims were more likely to succeed in the California state appellate 
 
88. Id. at 196. 
89. See generally id. 
90. Id. at 187. 
91. See generally Knapp, supra note 4. 
92. See id. at 620. 
93. Id. at 621–23. 
94. Id. at 622–23. 
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courts, with California state cases representing over one-third, or thirty-
two out of eighty-eight, of state unconscionability cases nationwide 
during that time period.95  Furthermore, most federal court decisions in 
which unconscionability arguments were successful came out of 
California federal courts or the Ninth Circuit.96  However, Knapp also 
found that twenty-two other states’ courts, as well as federal courts 
outside of the Ninth Circuit, decided in favor of parties’ 
unconscionability arguments.97  Although Knapp recognized that during 
the early years of arbitration unconscionability jurisprudence at least 
some state courts used the unconscionability doctrine to express their 
suspicion of arbitration, he concluded that: 
[S]uch outward shows of animosity have for the most part given 
way to a more measured response, in which the lower courts 
carefully attempt to identify which aspects of a particular 
arbitration scheme should be viewed as so fundamentally unfair 
that either the clause as a whole or those particular components 
of it should be deemed unconscionable and therefore 
unenforceable.98 
Because Knapp’s research encompasses the largest number of states 
over the longest period of time of any study to this point, it adds to our 
understanding of state courts’ application of unconscionability to 
arbitration agreements.  However, one problematic aspect of Knapp’s 
study is that he divided the case law, whether involving arbitration 
agreements or non-arbitration contract clauses, into only two basic 
categories: “those in which the claim failed completely and those in 
which it succeeded to some extent—actually or at least potentially.”99  
Thus, data from cases in which the court found the challenged provision 
unconscionable was lumped in with cases where the appellate court 
simply determined that the trial court should have considered a party’s 
unconscionability argument and remanded for further consideration of 
that issue.100  In cases in which the appellate court remanded to the trial 
 
95. Id. at 623–24. 
96. Id. at 624–25. 
97. Id. at 624. 
98. Id. at 626–27. 
99. Id. at 621. 
100. Id. at 621 n.62 (“Thus the category of successful cases for the purpose of this 
discussion would include not only cases in which a contract was completely invalidated or a 
particular term was struck down, but also those in which an appellate court merely held that a 
lower court had wrongly refused to consider a potentially valid claim of unconscionability.”). 
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court for further unconscionability analysis, however, it is not possible to 
determine whether the party asserting unconscionability was actually 
successful upon remand.  Thus, categorizing remand cases as 
“successful” may artificially inflate this category.  Instead, in many cases 
it may be more appropriate to view a remand as a signal that the trial 
court failed to follow appropriate procedural requirements for a proper 
analysis of a party’s unconscionability argument.  To deal with this 
uncertainty, the instant study treats these remand cases as a separate, 
third category of case law. 
Finally, although taking a national approach like Randall and Knapp 
did in their studies provides a perspective of how courts generally apply 
the unconscionability doctrine, the instant study provides less 
understanding of how individual states have approached this issue and 
the extent to which individual states follow broader national trends.  
Therefore, although this Article draws some broader conclusions about 
how state courts apply the unconscionability doctrine to both arbitration 
and non-arbitration contract provisions, it also seeks a greater 
understanding of the patterns that exist by comparing individual states’ 
approaches to the doctrine. 
IV. ACROSS THE SPECTRUM OF UNCONSCIONABILITY ANALYSIS: 
STATE COURTS’ APPLICATION OF THE UNCONSCIONABILITY 
DOCTRINE 
With the previous scholarly work as a foundation for my research 
and a curiosity about whether the observed trends held true across 
longer time periods when analyzing individual states’ unconscionability 
case law, I set out on this research project.  As discussed infra, the 
numbers proved somewhat surprising.101 Although there were certainly a 
significant number of unconscionability cases that concerned arbitration 
agreements—in fact, approximately fifty percent of all unconscionability 
cases during the period of this study—that number did not tell the entire 
story.102  My questions about this issue were not fully answered by the 
fact that, collectively, state courts were slightly more likely to find 
arbitration agreements unconscionable than other types of contract 
provisions.  Instead, when the numbers are broken down, a much more 
complex picture of state courts’ application of the unconscionability 
doctrine begins to emerge.  That complexity demonstrates that many 
 
101. See infra Part IV.A. 
102. See infra Part IV.A. 
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assumptions—of both courts and scholars—about state courts’ use of 
the unconscionability doctrine need reconsideration. 
A. The Big Picture: The Overall Numbers 
In order to obtain a full understanding of the state courts’ 
application of the unconscionability doctrine, this study first analyzes 
the breakdown of unconscionability cases in these twenty states by year, 
separated into cases involving arbitration agreements and those that 
involve challenges to other types of contract provisions.103  After gaining 
a greater understanding of the patterns that exist within 
unconscionability case law in general, this study then explores the 
success rates for these unconscionability challenges.  Throughout, this 
subsection remains focused on the more general national trends 
extrapolated from these cases.  In further subsections, those trends will 
be further broken down by state. 
1. Unconscionability Cases in General: The Breakdown Between 
Arbitration and Non-Arbitration Cases 
Within the twenty states surveyed for this study, the appellate courts 
engaged in unconscionability analysis in 460 cases between 1980 and 
2012.104  Of those cases, 231, or 50.22%, involved non-arbitration 
contract provisions.105  Additionally, 237 cases, or 51.52%, involved 
arbitration agreements.106  Over the course of more than thirty years, 
therefore, parties have sought to challenge arbitration and non-
arbitration contracts on fairly equal footing. 
Of course, these numbers do not tell the entire story.  First, some 
scholars argue that the number of arbitration cases demonstrates that 
parties are more likely to use the unconscionability doctrine in an 
attempt to challenge arbitration agreements than other types of 
contracts, and to a certain extent, at least in the last ten to fifteen years, 
this assertion is correct.107  In the non-arbitration context, there are 
 
103. See supra notes 9–10 and accompanying text; see also infra Table 1. 
104. See infra Table 1. 
105. See infra Table 1; see also infra Graph 1. 
106. See infra Table 1; see also infra Graph 1.  Eight cases involved both arbitration and 
non-arbitration provisions and have been counted in each category, explaining why there 
appear to be more than 100% of the cases being accounted for.  See infra note 264. 
107. See, e.g., Randall, supra note 4, at 194 (“Litigants rarely invoked unconscionability 
prior to the increase in the use of arbitration agreements. . . .  However, as the use of 
arbitration agreements has increased, claims of unconscionability have also increased . . . .”). 
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numerous different types of contract clauses at issue, such as provisions 
that limit damages,108 limit liability,109 or provide for liquidated damages 
in the event of a breach.110  If the non-arbitration cases were separated 
by type of contract provision at issue, the resulting numbers would 
highlight the current legal interest in arbitration, to be sure.  But it is 
also important to note that the unconscionability doctrine has been 
around for a very long time, and thus much of the case law in which 
parties used the doctrine to challenge other types of contracts would 
therefore come from the decades prior to 1980.111  Thus, by focusing 
solely on the case law since 1980, it is possible that this study, as well as 
the work of other scholars, has made the arbitration issue appear more 
significant than it would be if put into a long-term context.  In fact, it is 
likely that the use of the unconscionability doctrine has gone through 
cycles of popularity—at least in terms of its use in pleadings, if not in 
case outcomes.  It is also important to keep in mind the larger trend in 
litigation—that is, there have been an ever-increasing number of cases 
in litigation over time.112  Thus, adjusting for “inflation” of case filings 
more generally, the number of unconscionability cases, whether 
involving arbitration clauses or not, may not be as significant as they 
appear on the surface—but, that’s a potential topic for another article. 
 
108. See, e.g., Fireman’s Fund Am. Ins. Cos. v. Burns Elec. Sec. Servs., Inc., 417 N.E.2d 
131 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980); Leet v. Totah, 620 A.2d 1372 (Md. 1993); Chemtrol Adhesives, Inc. v. 
Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co., 537 N.E.2d 624 (Ohio 1989); Scott Reising Jewelers, Inc. v. ADT 
Sec. Servs., Inc., Nos. C-050322, C-050329, 2006 WL 6576746 (Ohio Ct. App. May 10, 2006); 
Motorists Mut. Ins. Co. v. ADT Sec. Sys., Nos. 14799, 14803, 1995 WL 461316 (Ohio Ct. App. 
Aug. 4, 1995). 
109. See, e.g., Municipality of Anchorage v. Locker, 723 P.2d 1261 (Alaska 1986); Nat’l 
Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Guardtronic, Inc., 64 S.W.3d 779 (Ark. Ct. App. 2002); Reuben H. 
Donnelley Corp. v. Krasny Supply Co., 592 N.E.2d 8 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991); Fireman’s Fund Am. 
Ins. Cos., 417 N.E.2d 131; Purcell Tire & Rubber Co. v. Exec. Beechcraft, Inc., 59 S.W.3d 505 
(Mo. 2001) (en banc); Scott Reising Jewelers, Inc., 2006 WL 6576746; Hurst v. Enter. Title 
Agency, Inc., 809 N.E.2d 689 (Ohio Ct. App. 2004). 
110. See, e.g., Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Architectural Mgmt., Inc., 550 N.E.2d 1110, 1115 
(Ill. App. Ct. 1990); Repair Masters Constr., Inc. v. Gary, 277 S.W.3d 854, 857 (Mo. Ct. App. 
2009); Reichert v. Rubloff Hammond, L.L.C., 645 N.W.2d 519, 527 (Neb. 2002); Buckingham 
v. Ryan, 953 P.2d 33, 36, 38 (N.M. Ct. App. 1997) (holding that a liquidated damages 
provision in a real estate contract was not unconscionable). 
111. See Knapp, supra note 4, at 612–13. 
112. See, e.g., Diarmuid F. O’Scannlain, Striking a Devil’s Bargain: The Federal Courts 
and Expanding Caseloads in the Twenty-First Century, 13 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 473, 474–
77 (2009) (describing the dramatic increase in the number of cases filed in the federal courts 
over the preceding four decades). 
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Moreover, the unconscionability case law numbers—whether 
involving arbitration agreements or non-arbitration provisions, did not 
remain constant for the duration of the time period of the instant study.  
Parties rarely used the unconscionability doctrine to challenge 
arbitration agreements in the 1980s,113 and the number of 
unconscionability challenges to arbitration agreements still remained 
relatively low throughout the 1990s.114  Although the number remained 
relatively low in 2000 and 2001,115 the number of unconscionability cases 
involving arbitration agreements climbed steadily between 2002 and 
2008.116  After the peak in 2008, the number of unconscionability cases 
involving arbitration agreements declined somewhat and appears to 
have stabilized, at least for now.117 
In contrast, the numbers for non-arbitration unconscionability cases 
have a different pattern, basically resembling a wave.118  Throughout the 
1980s and 1990s, the number of non-arbitration unconscionability cases 
remained relatively constant, but reached their highest points in 1981, 
1987, and 1999.119  The numbers stayed consistent for the years of 2000 
through 2004, before increasing again to ten cases each year in 2005 and 
2006.120  After declining a small amount in 2007 and more significantly in 
2008, the number of non-arbitration unconscionability cases hit their 
 
113. See infra Table 1.  Among the twenty states included in the survey, there was only 
one unconscionability case involving an arbitration agreement each year for the years 1983, 
1986, 1987, and 1988, and only two arbitration cases in 1989.  See infra Table 1.  There were 
no unconscionability cases involving arbitration agreements between the years 1980 and 1982 
or in 1984 and 1985.  See infra Table 1; see also infra Graphs 1, 4. 
114. See infra Table 1.  Although there were more unconscionability cases involving 
arbitration agreements in the 1990s than in the 1980s, the numbers still remained relatively 
low.  See infra Table 1.  There was one arbitration case each in 1994 and 1995, three cases in 
1993, four cases in 1991, 1992, and 1999, and five cases in 1998.  See infra Table 1.  However, 
there were no unconscionability cases involving arbitration agreements in 1990, 1996, and 
1997.  See infra Table 1; see also infra Graphs 1, 4. 
115. See infra Table 1.  There were six unconscionability cases involving arbitration 
agreements in 2000 and four cases in 2001.  See infra Table 1; see also infra Graph 4. 
116. See infra Table 1.  The arbitration unconscionability case numbers for the time 
period from 2002 through 2008 are as follows: thirteen cases in 2002, eleven in 2003, twenty-
two in 2004, nineteen in 2005, twenty-two in 2006, twenty-seven in 2007, and twenty-seven in 
2008.  See infra Table 1; see also infra Graphs 1, 4. 
117. See infra Table 1; Graphs 1, 4.  There were seventeen unconscionability cases 
involving arbitration agreements in 2009, fourteen in 2010, fifteen in 2011, and twelve in 2012.  
See infra Table 1; see also infra Graphs 1, 4. 
118. See infra Table 1; see also infra Graphs 1, 3. 
119. See infra Table 1; see also infra Graphs 1, 3.  There were ten non-arbitration 
unconscionability cases in 1981, eleven in 1987, and ten in 1999.  See infra Table 1. 
120. See infra Table 1; see also infra Graphs 1, 3. 
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highest peak in 2009 and 2010 with fourteen and thirteen cases, 
respectively.121 
2. Unconscionability Found: General Comparisons Between Arbitration 
and Non-Arbitration Cases 
Having generally surveyed the lay of the unconscionability landscape 
over the past thirty-two years, let us now focus on the central issues 
addressed by this Article.  How often do state courts find contract 
provisions to be unconscionable, and to what extent are they more likely 
to find arbitration agreements unconscionable than other types of 
contracts?  In reality, the answer to that question is not as simple as it 
might seem on the surface.  Although the overall numbers suggest that 
state courts have been more inclined to find arbitration agreements 
unconscionable than other types of contracts, the actual numbers do not 
demonstrate the type of dramatic contrast that the scholarly literature 
suggests should exist, and there are also some surprising outcomes.122 
In all, courts found contract provisions, whether involving 
arbitration or not, unconscionable in approximately twenty-three 
percent of cases.123  That number further breaks down as follows.  Out of 
the 237 arbitration unconscionability cases surveyed, state courts 
determined that arbitration clauses were unconscionable and refused to 
enforce the arbitration agreements, either in whole or in part, in sixty 
cases.124  Thus, in twenty-five percent of arbitration cases, the courts 
determined that the challenged clause was unconscionable.125  In 
contrast, courts found unconscionability in forty-six out of 231 non-
arbitration cases, amounting to twenty percent of those cases.126  These 
numbers demonstrate that although there is a difference between the 
percentage of arbitration agreements with unconscionable provisions 
and the percentage of non-arbitration provisions found unconscionable, 
the difference is not huge and, in fact, may not be considered that 
significant. 
There was one major surprise in the statistics, however.  Although 
there was not a significant difference over time in the percentage of 
 
121. See infra Table 1; see also infra Graphs 1, 3. 
122. Karen Halverson Cross, Letting the Arbitrator Decide Unconscionability Challenges, 
26 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 1, 9–10 (2011). 
123. See infra Table 1. 
124. See infra Table 1. 
125. See infra Table 1. 
126. See infra Table 1. 
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cases found unconscionable, there was a significant difference in the 
number of cases in which appellate courts considered the 
unconscionability issue for arbitration cases but remanded to the trial 
court for further unconscionability analysis.127  Since 1980, the state 
appellate courts remanded only thirteen non-arbitration cases to the 
trial courts for further unconscionability analysis, amounting to 
approximately 5.63% of all non-arbitration unconscionability cases.128  In 
contrast, appellate courts remanded thirty-five arbitration cases to the 
trial court for further unconscionability analysis, or just under fifteen 
percent of arbitration-related unconscionability cases.129  These numbers 
suggest that although appellate courts have historically applied the 
unconscionability doctrine fairly consistently to both arbitration and 
non-arbitration agreements, trial courts have sometimes struggled with 
how they should approach this legal concept.  Just because appellate 
courts remand more arbitration cases to the trial court for further 
unconscionability analysis, however, does not necessarily support a 
conclusion that the courts are less favorable to arbitration agreements.  
These cases are almost never appealed a second time, and, therefore, it 
is unknown what the outcome was in the trial court after remand.130 
B. Breaking it Down: Reoccurring Themes Within the Overall Numbers 
The overall numbers do not tell the entire story, however, and, in 
some ways, are actually misleading.  As discussed below, there is 
significant variation in how individual states’ unconscionability numbers 
play out.  When the numbers are broken down state by state, it becomes 
clear that the overall numbers do not represent how many states 
approach the unconscionability doctrine, whether applied to arbitration 
agreements or other types of contracts.  States fall at different points 
along the unconscionability spectrum, with some states’ courts rarely, if 
ever, finding any contract clauses unconscionable and, at the opposite 
end, other states’ courts appearing to be very sympathetic to 
unconscionability defenses regardless of the type of contract.  Although 
 
127. See infra Table 1; Graph 5. 
128. See infra Table 1. 
129. See infra Table 1. 
130. This uncertainty is one reason why I disagree with Professor Knapp’s inclusion of 
this category of cases with the cases in which courts found contract provisions to be 
unconscionable.  See Knapp, supra note 4, at 621 & n.62.  Professor Knapp describes this 
category of cases as the “potentially” successful category, but, as noted previously, the 
outcome upon remand is merely speculative.  See id. 
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four states are definitely more likely to find an arbitration agreement 
unconscionable than other types of contracts, other states are more 
moderate in their approaches to unconscionability and fall somewhere 
in the middle of the spectrum. 
1. The “Conservative” Approach: A Reluctance to Embrace the 
Unconscionability Doctrine 
On the one end of the unconscionability spectrum are states that 
have rarely found any contract provision, whether an arbitration 
provision or some other type of clause, unconscionable.  This Article 
will refer to this approach as the “conservative” approach to the 
unconscionability doctrine.  For obvious reasons, states that are 
conservative in their approach to unconscionability provide little 
support for the theory that courts treat arbitration agreements 
differently with respect to unconscionability analysis than they do other 
types of contract provisions.  Out of the twenty states that I analyzed for 
purposes of this study, I have classified ten as falling into the 
conservative category: Colorado, Maine, Maryland, Minnesota, 
Nebraska, New Hampshire, North Carolina, Oregon, Rhode Island, and 
South Carolina.131  Although the appellate courts in some of these states 
may occasionally find a contract provision unconscionable, it is certainly 
not a common phenomenon. 
A general summary of the unconscionability case law from these ten 
states during the time period from 1980 to 2012 provides a useful picture 
of the status of the unconscionability doctrine in these states.  As a 
preliminary matter, it is important to note that the courts in all of the 
conservative-approach states have recognized unconscionability as a 
possible contract defense.132  However, despite that recognition, during 
 
131. See infra Table 2. 
132. See, e.g., Davis v. M.L.G. Corp., 712 P.2d 985, 991–92 (Colo. 1986); Walther v. 
Sovereign Bank, 872 A.2d 735, 743 (Md. 2005); Int’l Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Franz, 534 N.W.2d 261, 
269 (Minn. 1995); Myers v. Neb. Inv. Council, 724 N.W.2d 776, 799–800 (Neb. 2006); Pittsfield 
Weaving Co. v. Grove Textiles, Inc., 430 A.2d 638, 639 (N.H. 1981); Tillman v. Commercial 
Credit Loans, Inc., 655 S.E.2d 362, 369–70 (N.C. 2008); Vasquez-Lopez v. Beneficial Or., Inc., 
152 P.3d 940, 948 (Or. Ct. App. 2007); Ruzzo v. LaRose Enters., 748 A.2d 261, 269 (R.I. 
2000); Munoz v. Green Tree Fin. Corp., 542 S.E.2d 360, 365 (S.C. 2001).  Although the 
Supreme Judicial Court of Maine has never applied Maine unconscionability law to a contract 
provision, the Kennebec County Superior Court-Augusta has held contract provisions to be 
unconscionable under Maine law.  See, e.g., Newcombe v. Mooers, No. CV-99-043, 2000 WL 
33675662, at *2 (Me. Super. Ct. Oct. 13, 2000).  In Barrett v. McDonald Investments, Inc., 870 
A.2d 146 (Me. 2005), the concurrence contained a detailed discussion of the unconscionability 
doctrine and stated that the contract at issue appeared to be unconscionable.  Id. at 155-56 
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the time period of the instant study, four of the ten states had no cases in 
which appellate courts considered whether the unconscionability 
doctrine could challenge an arbitration agreement: Maine,133 Nebraska,134 
New Hampshire,135 and Rhode Island.136  During the same time period, 
appellate courts in three other states—Maryland, Colorado, and 
Minnesota—considered the unconscionability doctrine in the context of 
arbitration agreements but found no arbitration provisions 
unconscionable.137  Furthermore, since 1980, the appellate courts in 
 
(Alexander, J., concurring).  I have not included Barrett in this study because neither the trial 
court nor the majority opinion identified unconscionability as an issue in the case or described 
any unconscionability arguments raised by the parties.  See generally Barrett v. McDonald 
Investments, Inc., No. CV-03-128, 2003 WL 25794014 (Me. Super. Ct. Dec. 22, 2003); Barrett, 
870 A.2d 146. 
133. See infra Table 2.  Since 1980, Maine has not had a single case in which the Maine 
Supreme Judicial Court applied Maine unconscionability law.  See infra Table 2. 
134. See infra Table 2.  Since 1980, Nebraska appellate courts have considered the 
unconscionability doctrine in five cases, all involving non-arbitration clauses.  See infra Table 
2.  Out of those five cases, the Nebraska Court of Appeals found unconscionability in one 
situation.  See Adams v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 498 N.W.2d 577, 591 (Neb. Ct. App. 1992).  That 
case involved a commercial contract.  See id. at 589–90. 
135. See infra Table 2.  Like Nebraska, New Hampshire has had five appellate cases 
involving the unconscionability doctrine since 1980, all involving non-arbitration contracts.  
See infra Table 2.  New Hampshire also only had one case in which the New Hampshire 
Supreme Court found unconscionability, a commercial contract case.  See infra Table 2; see 
also Pittsfield Weaving Co., 430 A.2d 638.  There has only been one appellate case in which a 
New Hampshire court considered the unconscionability doctrine since 1986.  See infra Table 
2; see also Pope v. Lee, 879 A.2d 735 (N.H. 2005). 
136. See infra Table 2.  The Rhode Island Supreme Court has only considered two 
unconscionability cases since 1980.  See infra Table 2.  See generally Ruzzo, 748 A.2d 261; 
Ostalkiewicz v. Guardian Alarm, 520 A.2d 563 (R.I. 1987).  The court held that the 
challenged provision was unconscionable in one of those cases.  See Ruzzo, 748 A.2d at 269.  
Although that amounts to a fifty percent success rate for unconscionability arguments, I have 
classified Rhode Island as a conservative state because it has only held a contract provision to 
be unconscionable on that one occasion.  However, the Rhode Island Supreme Court has not 
explicitly discussed procedural and substantive unconscionability as part of its 
unconscionability analysis.  See Ostalkiewicz, 520 A.2d at 565–66 (discussing several factors in 
its determination that the terms of a burglary alarm contract were not unconscionable); 
Ruzzo, 748 A.2d at 269 (holding that “in Rhode Island, a disclaimer for personal injuries 
arising from the use of a consumer product introduced into the stream of commerce [was per 
se] ‘unconscionable” (internal quotation mark omitted)). 
137. See infra Table 2.  Since 1980, Maryland appellate courts have analyzed whether 
arbitration provisions were unconscionable on five occasions but have never found a 
challenged arbitration provision to be unconscionable.  See infra Table 2.  Colorado has 
analyzed whether challenged contract provisions were unconscionable on nine occasions, with 
two of the nine cases involving arbitration agreements.  See infra Table 2.  Although the 
Colorado appellate courts have never found an arbitration agreement to be unconscionable, 
on one occasion a Colorado appellate court did remand a case back to the trial court for 
further proceedings related to an unconscionability argument.  See infra Table 2; see also 
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Maine and Maryland have not found any contract provision to be 
unconscionable.138  Although Minnesota courts have considered the 
unconscionability doctrine on twenty-two occasions, far surpassing the 
unconscionability case law of the other conservative states, the 
Minnesota appellate courts have only found a contract provision 
unconscionable on two occasions, less than ten percent of the time.139 
Moreover, even among state courts that have found contract 
provisions to be unconscionable, it has often been many years since their 
last successful unconscionability case.  For example, Minnesota 
appellate courts last found a contract provision unconscionable in 
1991,140 and the last time that a Nebraska appellate court found a 
contract clause to be unconscionable was in 1992.141  New Hampshire’s 
last successful unconscionability case was in 1981,142 and a Colorado 
appellate court last found a challenged contract provision 
unconscionable in 1986.143  Rhode Island’s last successful 
unconscionability case was in 2000.144  These statistics show that even as 
unconscionability challenges to arbitration agreements became more 
common on the national level in the last decade or so, the trend has not 
meant that those unconscionability defenses have become more 
successful in all states. 
Although North Carolina and South Carolina appellate courts have 
each found arbitration agreements unconscionable, their treatment of 
arbitration agreements, and their application of the unconscionability 
 
Estate of Grimm v. Evans, 251 P.3d 574, 576, 578 (Colo. App. 2010).  Although Minnesota 
appellate courts have considered whether contract provisions were unconscionable on 
twenty-two occasions, only one of those cases involved an arbitration agreement, and the 
court determined that the arbitration provision at issue in that case was not unconscionable.  
See infra Table 2; see also Ottman v. Fadden, 575 N.W.2d 593, 597 (Minn. Ct. App. 1998) 
(holding that arbitration provision in employment contract was not unconscionable). 
138. See infra Table 2. 
139. See infra Table 2; see also Glarner v. Time Ins. Co., 465 N.W.2d 591, 595–96, 598 
(Minn. Ct. App. 1991); Zontelli & Sons, Inc. v. City of Nashwauk, 353 N.W.2d 600, 604–05 
(Minn. Ct. App. 1984) (holding that contract’s remedy provisions were unconscionable), 
rev’d, 373 N.W.2d 744 (Minn. 1985).  The Minnesota Supreme Court later reversed the 
appellate court’s unconscionability determination in Zontelli & Sons, Inc. v. City of 
Nashwauk.  See Zontelli & Sons, Inc. v. City of Nashwauk, 373 N.W.2d 744, 753, 756 (Minn. 
1985). 
140. See generally Glarner, 465 N.W.2d 591. 
141. See generally Adams v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 498 N.W.2d 577 (Neb. Ct. App. 1992). 
142. See generally Pittsfield Weaving Co. v. Grove Textiles, Inc., 430 A.2d 638 (N.H. 
1981). 
143. See generally Davis v. M.L.G. Corp., 712 P.2d 985 (Colo. 1986). 
144. See generally Ruzzo v. LaRose Enters., 748 A.2d 261 (R.I. 2000). 
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doctrine more generally, is still much more conservative than the 
average.145  For example, South Carolina appellate courts have 
considered the unconscionability doctrine in nine cases, ultimately 
finding the challenged contract provisions unconscionable in one case, 
which happened to be a case in which an arbitration agreement was at 
issue.146  Thus, South Carolina appellate courts have found a contract 
provision unconscionable in 11.1% of its total unconscionability cases.147  
Even if one only considers South Carolina’s arbitration 
unconscionability cases, South Carolina appellate courts found the 
challenged arbitration provisions to be unconscionable in one out of 
seven cases, or only 14.29% of the time, which is still far below the 
average—whether considering arbitration agreements, non-arbitration 
contract provisions, or both—among the states in this study.148 
North Carolina courts have had a similar approach to those of South 
Carolina in this respect.  Since 1980, North Carolina appellate courts 
have considered unconscionability arguments in twenty cases.149  In only 
one of those cases, which involved an arbitration agreement, the North 
Carolina appellate courts found the challenged provision to be 
unconscionable, amounting to only five percent of the unconscionability 
cases.150  Even if considering arbitration agreements, however, North 
Carolina appellate courts have only found challenged contract 
provisions to be unconscionable in one out of eight cases, or 12.5% of 
the time, once again well below the average for states in this study.151 
 
145. See generally infra Tables 1–2; see also supra text accompanying notes 123–26. 
146. See infra Table 2; see also Simpson v. MSA of Myrtle Beach, Inc., 644 S.E.2d 663, 
673 (S.C. 2007). 
147. See infra Table 2. 
148. See infra Tables 1–2; see also supra text accompanying notes 125–26.  Interestingly, 
South Carolina has also considered whether a clause in an arbitration agreement banning 
class action arbitration is unconscionable.  See Herron v. Century BMW, 693 S.E.2d 394 (S.C. 
2010), vacated sub nom. Sonic Auto., Inc. v. Watts, 131 S. Ct. 2872 (2011) (mem.), reinstated 
by 719 S.E.2d 640 (S.C. 2011).  The South Carolina Supreme Court determined that the 
challenged provision was not unconscionable but still refused to enforce it on public policy 
grounds.  See id. at 398–400.  Ultimately, the U.S. Supreme Court vacated the South Carolina 
Supreme Court’s decision and remanded for further proceedings in light of AT&T Mobility.  
See Sonic Auto., Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2872, reh’g sub. nom. Herron v. Century BMW, 719 S.E.2d 
640 (S.C. 2011). 
149. See infra Table 2. 
150. See infra Table 2; see also Tillman v. Commercial Credit Loans, Inc., 655 S.E.2d 
362, 373 (N.C. 2008). 
151. See infra Table 2; see also supra text accompanying note 125.  On one other 
occasion, the North Carolina Appellate Court considered the unconscionability doctrine but 
ultimately remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings related to the 
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The final state that falls within the conservative category is Oregon.  
Oregon courts applied the unconscionability doctrine to contracts in 
nine cases between 1980 and 2012.152  However, all but one of those cases 
were decided between 2005 and 2012.153  Two of the cases involved non-
arbitration contract clauses,154 and the Oregon courts found one of those 
challenged contracts unconscionable.155  The other seven cases involved 
arbitration agreements.156  Oregon courts only held challenged 
arbitration clauses unconscionable in one of the seven cases, or 14.29% 
of the time.157  Although Oregon’s overall unconscionability numbers, 
22.22% unconscionable, put the state more in keeping with the 
unconscionability numbers for all twenty states combined, this Article 
categorizes Oregon as one of the conservative states because it has not 
been as sympathetic to unconscionability defenses in the arbitration 
context and has not found any contract provision unconscionable since 
2007.158 
2. The Opposite Extreme: States that Appear to Have Embraced the 
Unconscionability Doctrine in Both Arbitration and Non-Arbitration 
Contexts 
On the opposite side of the spectrum are the states that appear to 
have embraced the unconscionability doctrine in both the arbitration 
and non-arbitration context.  Admittedly, the number of states that fall 
into this category is much smaller.159  Out of the twenty states analyzed 
 
unconscionability issue.  See Kucan v. Advance Am., 660 S.E.2d 98, 103–04 (N.C. Ct. App. 
2008). 
152. See infra Table 2. 
153. The nine Oregon unconscionability cases are Hatkoff v. Portland Adventist Med. 
Ctr., 287 P.3d 1113 (Or. Ct. App. 2012); Livingston v. Metro. Pediatrics, LLC, 227 P.3d 796 
(Or. Ct. App. 2010); Hays Grp., Inc. v. Biege, 193 P.3d 1028 (Or. Ct. App. 2008); Sprague v. 
Quality Rests. Nw., Inc., 162 P.3d 331 (Or. Ct. App. 2007); Motsinger v. Lithia Rose-FT, Inc., 
156 P.3d 156 (Or. Ct. App. 2007); Vasquez-Lopez v. Beneficial Or., Inc., 152 P.3d 940 (Or. Ct. 
App. 2007); DEX Media, Inc. v. Nat’l Mgmt. Servs., Inc., 150 P.3d 1093 (Or. Ct. App. 2007); 
Carey v. Lincoln Loan Co., 125 P.3d 814 (Or. Ct. App. 2005); and Or. Bank v. Nautilus Crane 
& Equip. Corp., 683 P.2d 95 (Or. Ct. App. 1984). 
154. See generally Carey, 125 P.3d 814; Or. Bank, 683 P.2d 95. 
155. Carey, 125 P.3d at 831–32. 
156. See generally Livingston, 227 P.3d 796; Hays Grp., Inc., 193 P.3d 1028; Sprague, 162 
P.3d 331; Motsinger, 156 P.3d 156; Vasquez-Lopez, 152 P.3d 940; DEX Media, Inc., 150 P.3d 
1093. 
157. See Vasquez-Lopez, 152 P.3d at 948–53. 
158. Oregon courts last held a contract provision unconscionable in Vasquez-Lopez v. 
Beneficial Or., Inc., a case involving an arbitration agreement.  See generally id. 
159. See infra Table 3. 
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for purposes of this study, three states’ appellate courts have shown a 
significant tendency to be sympathetic to unconscionability defenses: 
Alaska, Arkansas, and Vermont.160  Although the courts in these states 
have found arbitration agreements to be unconscionable, they have 
often also found non-arbitration provisions to be unconscionable.161  In 
fact, the Alaska, Arkansas, and Vermont appellate courts have found 
challenged contract provisions to be unconscionable in almost fifty 
percent of the unconscionability cases argued before them.162 
Specifically, the Alaska Supreme Court has considered 
unconscionability arguments in eleven cases since 1980, three of which 
involved arbitration agreements and eight of which involved non-
arbitration contract provisions.163  Of those eleven cases, the court has 
found challenged contract provisions to be unconscionable on five 
occasions, or in approximately forty-five percent of cases.164  One of 
these five cases involved an arbitration agreement,165 but the other four 
involved non-arbitration provisions.166  Arkansas appellate courts have 
also applied the unconscionability doctrine in eleven cases since 1980 
and have found challenged provisions to be unconscionable in five of 
those cases, or approximately forty-five percent of the time.167  Just like 
the breakdown in Alaska, one of the five unconscionable cases in 
Arkansas involved an arbitration agreement,168 and the other four 
involved non-arbitration contract provisions.169  Finally, the Vermont 
 
160. See infra Table 3. 
161. See infra Table 3. 
162. See infra Table 3. 
163. See infra Table 3. 
164. See infra Table 3. 
165. See infra Table 3; see also Gibson v. Nye Frontier Ford, Inc., 205 P.3d 1091 (Alaska 
2009) 
166. See infra Table 3; see also Pierce v. Catalina Yachts, Inc., 2 P.3d 618 (Alaska 2000); 
Helstrom v. N. Slope Borough, 797 P.2d 1192 (Alaska 1990); Municipality of Anchorage v. 
Locker, 723 P.2d 1261 (Alaska 1986); Vockner v. Erickson, 712 P.2d 379 (Alaska 1986).  
Although the Alaska Supreme Court has historically found contract provisions 
unconscionable in a large percentage of cases, it may be worth noting that the only case in 
which the Alaska Supreme Court has found a contract provision unconscionable since 2000 
was the 2009 arbitration case.  See Gibson, 205 P.3d at 1098. 
167. See infra Table 3. 
168. See infra Table 3; see also Waverly-Ark., Inc. v. Keener, No. CA 07-524, 2008 WL 
316149, at *1 (Ark. Ct. App. Feb. 6, 2008).  This is actually the only case that I found in which 
the Arkansas appellate courts have considered whether an arbitration agreement is 
unconscionable.  See id. 
169. See infra Table 3; see also Criner v. Reddell, 2011 Ark. App. 661; Garrett v. Fite, 
2009 Ark. App. 869; General Elec. Capital Corp. v. McKiever, No. CA98-581, 1999 WL 96029 
 
LANDRUM-FINAL (7-10-14) (DO NOT DELETE) 7/10/2014  10:35 AM 
2014] MUCH ADO ABOUT NOTHING 787 
Supreme Court has found contract provisions unconscionable in three 
out of six cases, or fifty percent of the cases in which the Court has 
applied the unconscionability doctrine.170  Out of the three cases in 
which unconscionability was found, one case involved both arbitration 
and non-arbitration unconscionable provisions,171 and the other two 
cases involved non-arbitration contract provisions.172 
Although appellate courts in Alaska, Arkansas, and Vermont have 
only had limited opportunities to consider unconscionability arguments 
since 1980, the outcomes of those cases demonstrate that these states’ 
courts are much more open to an unconscionability defense than the 
conservative states discussed supra.173  Moreover, these states appear just 
as likely, if not more so, to find a non-arbitration contract 
unconscionable as they are to apply that doctrine to arbitration 
agreements.174  Although Alaska, Arkansas, and Vermont appellate 
courts have embraced the unconscionability doctrine, the outcomes in 
these states’ cases do not support the conclusion that state courts are 
more likely to use unconscionability to invalidate arbitration agreements 
than other types of contracts. 
3. States with Appellate Courts that Are Only Sympathetic to 
Unconscionability Arguments in the Arbitration Context 
In an additional four states—Missouri, Nevada, New Mexico, and 
Illinois—the appellate courts also appear to be very sympathetic to 
unconscionability arguments, but only if the challenged provision is part 
of an arbitration agreement.175  However, if the challenged contract 
provision is not related to arbitration, these courts rarely, if ever, find 
the challenged provision unconscionable.176  Thus, these states appear to 
illustrate exactly the type of concern that the U.S. Supreme Court, as 
well as many legal scholars, have expressed regarding state courts’ 
 
(Ark. Ct. App. Feb. 17, 1999); Associated Press v. S. Ark. Radio Co., 809 S.W.2d 695 (Ark. 
Ct. App. 1991). 
170. See infra Table 3. 
171. See infra Table 3; see also Glassford v. BrickKicker, 35 A.3d 1044, 1054 (Vt. 2011). 
172. See infra Table 3; see also Colgan v. Agway, Inc., 553 A.2d 143 (Vt. 1988); Val 
Preda Leasing, Inc. v. Rodriguez, 540 A.2d 648 (Vt. 1987). 
173. Compare infra Table 2, with infra Table 3.  See supra Part IV.B.1–2. 
174. See infra Table 3. 
175. See infra Table 4. 
176. See infra Table 4. 
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application of the unconscionability doctrine to arbitration 
agreements.177 
On the surface, Missouri would appear to fall into the previous 
category of states, as Missouri has found challenged contract provisions 
unconscionable in twelve out of twenty-four cases, or fifty percent of the 
time.178  However, the majority of the contract provisions found 
unconscionable by Missouri courts were arbitration provisions.179  
Specifically, out of the thirteen arbitration-related cases in which 
Missouri courts considered an unconscionability defense, ten, or 
approximately seventy-seven percent, were found unconscionable.180  In 
contrast, Missouri courts only found non-arbitration contract clauses 
unconscionable in two out of eleven cases, or eighteen percent of the 
time.181  Although Missouri courts have found challenged arbitration 
clauses unconscionable in the majority of cases, they often sever the 
unconscionable provision and enforce the remainder of the arbitration 
agreement.182  It is also worth noting that four183 of the Missouri cases 
 
177. See, e.g., supra notes 2–4 and accompanying text. 
178. See infra Table 4. 
179. See infra Table 4. 
180. See infra Table 4.  The ten cases in which arbitration agreements were held 
unconscionable include Brewer v. Mo. Title Loans, 364 S.W.3d 486, 496 (Mo. 2012) (en banc); 
Brewer v. Mo. Title Loans, Inc., 323 S.W.3d 18, 24 (Mo. 2010) (en banc), vacated, 131 S. Ct. 
2875 (2011) (mem.); Ruhl v. Lee’s Summit Honda, 322 S.W.3d 136, 139–40 (Mo. 2010); 
Manfredi v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Kan. City, 340 S.W.3d 126, 135 (Mo. Ct. App. 2011); 
Shaffer v. Royal Gate Dodge, Inc., 300 S.W.3d 556, 561 (Mo. Ct. App. 2009); Woods v. QC 
Fin. Servs., Inc., 280 S.W.3d 90, 99 (Mo. Ct. App. 2008); State ex rel. Vincent v. Schneider, 194 
S.W.3d 853, 861 (Mo. 2006) (en banc); Whitney v. Alltel Commc’ns, Inc., 173 S.W.3d 300, 314 
(Mo. Ct. App. 2005); Greenpoint Credit, L.L.C. v. Reynolds, 151 S.W.3d 868, 876 (Mo. Ct. 
App. 2004); Swain v. Auto Servs., Inc., 128 S.W.3d 103, 109 (Mo. Ct. App. 2003).  Missouri 
courts found that challenged arbitration provisions were not unconscionable in only two 
cases: Grossman v. Thoroughbred Ford, Inc., 297 S.W.3d 918, 924 (Mo. Ct. App. 2009); and 
Kan. City Urology, P.A. v. United Healthcare Servs., 261 S.W.3d 7, 15 (Mo. Ct. App. 2008).  
Despite the fact that the Brewer decisions involve the same parties and legal issues, I have 
included both decisions because they are technically different court decisions.  See generally 
Brewer, 364 S.W.3d 486; Brewer, 323 S.W.3d 18.  Despite these numbers, Professor Michael 
A. Wolff, a former judge on the Missouri Supreme Court, asserts that “Missouri law is not 
hostile to mandatory arbitration.”  Michael A. Wolff, Is There Life After Concepcion? State 
Courts, State Law, and the Mandate of Arbitration, 56 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1269, 1269 n.*, 1275 
(2012). 
181. See infra Table 4.  The two cases in which Missouri courts found non-arbitration 
contract provisions unconscionable are Repair Masters Constr., Inc. v. Gary, 277 S.W.3d 854, 
859 (Mo. Ct. App. 2009); and Oldham’s Farm Sausage Co. v. Salco, Inc., 633 S.W.2d 177, 183 
(Mo. Ct. App. 1982). 
182. See, e.g., Woods, 280 S.W.3d at 99–100; Greenpoint Credit, L.L.C., 151 S.W.3d at 
875 n.5; Swain, 128 S.W.3d at 109. 
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involving unconscionable arbitration provisions were cases in which the 
Missouri courts specifically determined that provisions barring class 
action arbitration were unconscionable.184  In fact, in one of those cases, 
Brewer v. Missouri Title Loans, Inc., the U.S. Supreme Court reversed 
the Missouri Supreme Court’s unconscionability determination and 
remanded the case for further consideration in light of the U.S. Supreme 
Court’s holding in AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion.185 
Similar to the outcome in Missouri appellate courts, the numbers 
demonstrate that New Mexico appellate courts are more sympathetic to 
unconscionability challenges to arbitration agreements than to other 
types of contract provisions.186  Between 1980 and 2011, New Mexico 
courts considered an unconscionability defense in contract cases on 
fifteen occasions.187  Six of those cases involved challenges to non-
arbitration contract provisions, but none of those contracts were found 
unconscionable.188  In contrast, the New Mexico courts found arbitration 
provisions unconscionable in seven out of nine cases, or approximately 
seventy-eight percent of the time.189  Further, in two of those cases, the 
 
183. See generally Brewer, 323 S.W.3d 18; Ruhl, 322 S.W.3d 136; Shaffer, 300 S.W.3d 556; 
Woods, 280 S.W.3d 90.  But see Robinson v. Title Lenders, Inc., 364 S.W.3d 505, 507 (Mo. 
2012) (en banc) (holding, in light of the U.S. Supreme Court’s holding in AT&T Mobility 
LLC, that the trial court erred by determining that a class action waiver in a consumer 
arbitration agreement was unconscionable).  The U.S. Supreme Court also remanded 
Missouri Title Loans, Inc. v. Brewer to the Missouri Supreme Court, in light of AT&T 
Mobility LLC.  See Mo. Title Loans, Inc. v. Brewer, 131 S. Ct. 2875 (2011) (mem.).  Upon 
remand, the Missouri Supreme Court determined that the class action waiver was not 
unconscionable, but, taken as a whole, the arbitration agreement was still unconscionable.  
Brewer, 364 S.W.3d at 488, 495. 
184. See generally Brewer, 323 S.W.3d 18; Ruhl, 322 S.W.3d 136; Shaffer, 300 S.W.3d 556; 
Woods, 280 S.W.3d at 99. 
185. Mo. Title Loans, Inc. v. Brewer, 131 S. Ct. 2875 (2011) (mem.), vacating Brewer, 323 
S.W.3d 18.  In light of the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in AT&T Mobility LLC, it is unclear 
whether Missouri courts will continue to invalidate arbitration provisions at the same rate as 
they have done in recent years.  AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011); 
see also infra Table 4.  However, that decision does not mean that Missouri courts do not still 
use the unconscionability doctrine to invalidate arbitration provisions.  See generally Brewer, 
364 S.W.3d 486; see also AT&T Mobility LLC, 131 S. Ct. at 1745–46; supra note 183. 
186. See infra Table 4. 
187. See infra Table 4. 
188. See infra Table 4. 
189. See infra Table 4.  The seven cases in which New Mexico courts found arbitration 
agreements unconscionable are Rivera v. Am. Gen. Fin. Servs., Inc., 259 P.3d 803, 819 (N.M. 
2011); Cordova v. World Fin. Corp. of N.M., 208 P.3d 901, 912 (N.M. 2009); Fiser v. Dell 
Computer Corp., 188 P.3d 1215, 1222 (N.M. 2008); Padilla v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 
68 P.3d 901, 907 (N.M. 2003); Clay v. N.M. Title Loans, Inc., 288 P.3d 888, 901 (N.M. Ct. App. 
2012); Coulter v. Laurel View Healthcare, No. 30,249, 2012 WL 4434366, at *2 (N.M. Ct. App. 
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New Mexico Supreme Court determined that provisions barring class 
action arbitration were unconscionable.190  It is also worth noting that all 
of the non-arbitration cases were decided in 1998 or earlier, and all of 
the arbitration cases were decided between 1999 and 2012.191  
Accordingly, for more than a decade, the use of the unconscionability 
doctrine has been solely focused on challenging arbitration agreements, 
a trend that is not surprising considering its success in New Mexico 
appellate courts during that time period.192 
Although Nevada courts are not as sympathetic to unconscionability 
challenges to arbitration agreements as Missouri and New Mexico, 
Nevada unconscionability outcomes still raise the same concerns about 
uneven unconscionability outcomes as those other states do.  Since 1980, 
the Nevada Supreme Court has considered an unconscionability 
contract defense on nine occasions.193  Seven of those cases involved 
arbitration agreements, and all three cases in which the court found 
unconscionability involved arbitration clauses.194  Thus, Nevada courts 
have found challenged arbitration agreements unconscionable forty-
three percent of the time, a percentage far above the average for this 
study.195  As discussed supra, however, in its most recent two 
unconscionability cases, the Nevada Supreme Court held that the 
Federal Medicare Act preempted Nevada contract law, and, therefore, 
the challenged contract provisions in those two cases were not 
 
Aug. 17, 2012); and Felts v. CLK Mgmt., Inc., 254 P.3d 124, 139 (N.M. Ct. App. 2011). 
190. See Fiser, 188 P.3d at 1221–22; Felts, 254 P.3d at 137–39. 
191. Rivera, 259 P.3d 803 (2011, arbitration); Cordova, 208 P.3d 901 (2009, arbitration); 
Fiser, 188 P.3d 1215 (2008, arbitration); Padilla, 68 P.3d 901 (2003, arbitration); Guthmann v. 
La Vida Llena, 709 P.2d 675 (N.M. 1985) (non-arbitration); Manzano Ind. v. Mathis, 678 P.2d 
1179 (N.M. 1984) (non-arbitration); Smith v. Price’s Creameries, 650 P.2d 825 (N.M. 1982) 
(non-arbitration); Clay, 288 P.3d 888 (2012, arbitration); Coulter, 2012 WL 4434366 (2012, 
arbitration); Felts, 254 P.3d 124 (2011, arbitration); Barron v. Evangelical Lutheran Good 
Samaritan Soc’y, 265 P.3d 720 (N.M. Ct. App. 2011) (arbitration); Monette v. Tinsley, 975 
P.2d 361 (N.M. Ct. App. 1999) (arbitration); Buckingham v. Ryan, 953 P.2d 33 (N.M. Ct. 
App. 1997) (non-arbitration); Nearburg v. Yates Petroleum Corp., 943 P.2d 560 (N.M. Ct. 
App. 1997) (non-arbitration); Bowlin’s, Inc. v. Ramsey Oil Co., 662 P.2d 661 (N.M. Ct. App. 
1983) (non-arbitration). 
192. See infra Tables 1, 4. 
193. See infra Table 4. 
194. See infra Table 4.  The three cases in which the Nevada Supreme Court found 
arbitration agreements unconscionable include Gonski v. Second Jud. Dist. Ct., 245 P.3d 1164, 
1173 (Nev. 2010); D.R. Horton, Inc. v. Green, 96 P.3d 1159, 1165 (Nev. 2004); and Burch v. 
Second Jud. Dist. Ct., 49 P.3d 647, 651 (Nev. 2002). 
195. See infra Table 4; see also the discussion of this study’s combined unconscionability 
numbers for all twenty states, supra notes 124–25 and accompanying text. 
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unconscionable.196  It is also worth noting that, between 1980 and 2001, 
Nevada only had one case analyzing unconscionability—one that did not 
involve an arbitration agreement.197  The other eight cases were decided 
since 2001.198  Thus, Nevada’s unconscionability case law follows a 
similar trend to that of New Mexico in this respect.199 
The last state that fits in this category is Illinois.  Once again, Illinois 
appellate courts are not as extreme as Missouri and New Mexico courts 
in their application of the unconscionability doctrine to arbitration 
agreements, but there is still a significant difference between Illinois 
courts’ favorable unconscionability determinations in the arbitration 
context versus other types of contracts.200  Specifically, Illinois courts 
have considered an unconscionability defense in non-arbitration 
contracts on twenty-four occasions, and they found unconscionable 
three of those contracts, or 12.5%.201  In contrast, Illinois courts 
considered unconscionability arguments in twenty-one arbitration cases, 
and, in six of those cases, or approximately twenty-nine percent, the 
courts held those challenged arbitration provisions unconscionable.202  
However, like the Missouri courts, the Illinois courts often still enforce 
the arbitration agreements after severing the unconscionable 
 
196. See Pacificare of Nev., Inc. v. Rogers, 266 P.3d 596, 601 (Nev. 2011); Pacificare of 
Nev., Inc. v. Meana, No. 55754, 2011 WL 5146064 (Nev. Oct. 27, 2011); see also infra Table 4. 
197. See Mallin v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 839 P.2d 105, 118 (Nev. 1992). 
198. See generally Rogers, 266 P.3d 596; Meana, 2011 WL 5146064; Gonski, 245 P.3d 
1164; KJH & RDA Investor Grp., LLC v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 281 P.3d 1192 (Nev. 2009) 
(unpublished table decision); Clifton v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 238 P.3d 802 (Nev. 2008) 
(unpublished table decision); Boulder Oaks Cmty. Ass’n v. B & J Andrews Enters., LLC, 169 
P.3d 1155 (Nev. 2007); D.R. Horton, Inc., 96 P.3d 1159; Burch, 49 P.3d at 651. 
199. Compare supra notes 193–98 and accompanying text, with supra notes 186–92 and 
accompanying text. 
200. See infra Table 4. 
201. See infra Table 4.  The three cases in which Illinois appellate courts found non-
arbitration contract provisions unconscionable include Razor v. Hyundai Motor Am., 854 
N.E.2d 607, 625 (Ill. 2006); Dubey v. Public Storage, Inc., 918 N.E.2d 265, 276 (Ill. App. Ct. 
2009); and Frank’s Maint. & Eng’g, Inc. v. C. A. Roberts Co., 408 N.E.2d 403, 411 (Ill. App. 
Ct. 1980). 
202. See infra Table 4.  The six cases in which Illinois courts found arbitration provisions 
to be unconscionable are Kinkel v. Cingular Wireless LLC, 857 N.E.2d 250, 278 (Ill. 2006); 
Timmerman v. Grain Exch., LLC, 915 N.E.2d 113, 121 (Ill. App. Ct. 2009); Keefe v. Allied 
Home Mortg. Corp., 912 N.E.2d 310, 318 (Ill. App. Ct. 2009); Wigginton v. Dell, Inc., 890 
N.E.2d 541, 549 (Ill. App. Ct. 2008); Kinkel v. Cingular Wireless, LLC, 828 N.E.2d 812, 818 
(Ill. App. Ct. 2005), aff’d, 858 N.E.2d 250 (Ill. 2006); and Parker v. Am. Family Ins. Co., 734 
N.E.2d 83, 86 (Ill. App. Ct. 2000).  Despite the fact that the Kinkel decisions involve the same 
parties and legal issues, I have included both decisions because they are technically different 
court decisions.  See generally Kinkel, 857 N.E.2d 250; Kinkel, 828 N.E.2d 812. 
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provision.203  Like Missouri and New Mexico courts, Illinois courts have 
also been hostile to contract provisions barring class action arbitration.204 
What these numbers demonstrate is that these four 
unconscionability-sympathetic states, unlike the states discussed 
previously, illustrate the exact problem that concerned the U.S. 
Supreme Court, as well as many legal scholars: the tendency to apply the 
unconscionability doctrine in a way that invalidates arbitration 
provisions more often than other types of contract provisions.205  
Certainly, the numbers indicate that the state courts in Missouri, 
Nevada, New Mexico, and Illinois bear watching in the future.  Because 
Missouri, New Mexico, and Illinois courts have previously found 
unconscionable provisions barring class action arbitration,206 it will be 
interesting to see how those state courts choose react to AT&T Mobility 
LLC v. Concepcion in the long term, and how those reactions affect 
their application of the unconscionability doctrine to future arbitration 
cases. 
4. The Moderate Approach: The Middle Ground 
In comparison to the states discussed supra, two other states in this 
study, Ohio and Mississippi, represent a more moderate approach to the 
unconscionability doctrine.  Specifically, as demonstrated below, since 
1980 appellate courts in Ohio and Mississippi have entertained 
arguments regarding the applicability of the unconscionability defense 
in numerous cases, and, in some cases, have determined that challenged 
contract provisions—both arbitration agreements and non-arbitration 
clauses—were unconscionable.  However, although both Ohio and 
Mississippi appellate courts are willing to consider unconscionability 
arguments, those arguments have not had nearly the level of success that 
they have had in Alaska, Arkansas, Vermont, Missouri, New Mexico, 
and Nevada.207  Over time, Ohio and Mississippi courts have developed a 
relatively balanced approach to unconscionability, both in the 
arbitration and non-arbitration context. 
 
 
203. See, e.g., Kinkel, 857 N.E.2d at 276–78; Keefe, 912 N.E.2d at 320; Wigginton, 890 
N.E.2d at 549–50. 
204. See, e.g., Kinkel, 857 N.E.2d at 263–75; Wigginton, 890 N.E.2d at 548–49. 
205. See infra Table 4. 
206. See supra notes 183–84, 190, 204 and accompanying text. 
207. Compare infra Table 5, with infra Tables 3–4. 
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a. Ohio: A Significant Number of Unconscionability Cases, but a 
Moderate Approach Overall 
Between 1980 and 2012, Ohio appellate courts evaluated 
unconscionability in any type of contract, whether including arbitration 
or not, in 208 cases.208  Of those cases, 122 involved arbitration clauses, 
or approximately fifty-nine percent, while eighty-eight cases, or 
approximately forty-two percent, did not.209  In reality, those figures are 
skewed because the first unconscionability challenge to an arbitration 
clause was not heard at the appellate level in Ohio until 1987.210  If only 
looking at the time period from 1987 through 2012, Ohio appellate 
courts heard 195 unconscionability challenges to contracts of various 
types, including 122 cases involving arbitration clauses, or 62.56%, and 
seventy-five cases that did not involve arbitration clauses, or 38.46%.211  
These numbers strongly suggest that in Ohio, parties are more likely to 
use the unconscionability doctrine to challenge contracts when 
arbitration clauses are at issue. 
Having found that parties are more likely to challenge arbitration 
clauses than other types of contracts on the basis of unconscionability, a 
second question immediately begs attention: Are Ohio appellate courts 
more likely to find an arbitration clause unconscionable than they are to 
find other types of contracts?  Based on several scholarly critiques of 
prominent cases,212 I expected to find a significant difference in the 
numbers in this area.  Much to my surprise, those expectations were not 
met.  When looking at appellate holdings from 1987 through 2012, I 
found that appellate courts were slightly more likely to find non-
arbitration contracts unconscionable than they were to find arbitration 
agreements unconscionable.  During that time period, twenty out of 122 
arbitration clauses were found unconscionable, equating to 16.39% of 
arbitration clauses evaluated.213  In comparison, during that same time 
 
208. See infra Table 5. 
209. See infra Table 5. 
210. The first Ohio appellate case involving an unconscionability challenge to an 
arbitration agreement was Motorists Mut. Ins. Co. v. Said, No. 52700, 1987 WL 16532 (Ohio 
Ct. App. Sept. 3, 1987). 
211. See infra Table 5. 
212. See, e.g., Burton, supra note 4, at 491–94 & nn.152, 158, 163, 173 & 180, 499 & n.219; 
Gavin, supra note 4, at 267–68 & nn.136–38; Randall, supra note 4 at 194–95 & n.35, 213–14 & 
n.107. 
213. See infra Table 5.  The twenty cases in which appellate courts found a challenged 
arbitration clause to be unconscionable include Williams v. Aetna Fin. Co., 700 N.E.2d 859, 
865–67 (Ohio 1998); Schaefer v. Allstate Ins. Co., 590 N.E.2d 1242, 1251–53 (Ohio 1992) 
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period, courts found twelve out of seventy-five non-arbitration contracts 
unconscionable, equating to sixteen percent of other contracts 
evaluated.214  Moreover, if one also considers the contract cases 
involving unconscionability analysis between 1980 and 1987, between 
1980 and 2012, courts found a total of seventeen out of eighty-eight non-
arbitration contracts unconscionable, which is 19.32% of cases decided 
on those grounds.215  Thus, historically, Ohio appellate courts have been 
 
(plurality opinion) (Wright, J., concurring); Rude v. NUCO Educ. Corp., 2011-Ohio-6789, 
¶ 30 (Ct. App.); Wascovich v. Personacare of Ohio, Inc., 943 N.E.2d 1030, 1039 (Ohio Ct. 
App. 2010); Brunke v. Ohio State Home Servs., Inc., 2008-Ohio-5394, ¶ 18 (Ct. App.); Hayes 
v. Oakridge Home, 886 N.E.2d 928, 932 (Ohio Ct. App. 2008), rev’d, 908 N.E.2d 408 (Ohio 
2009); Bayes v. Merle’s Metro Builders/Boulevard Constr., LLC, 2007-Ohio-7125, ¶ 40 (Ct. 
App.); Taylor Bldg. Corp. of Am. v. Benfield, 860 N.E.2d 1058, 1068 (Ohio Ct. App. 2006), 
rev’d in part, aff’d in part, 884 N.E.2d 12 (Ohio 2008); Felix v. Ganley Chevrolet, Inc., 2006-
Ohio-4500, ¶ 28 (Ct. App.); Schwartz v. Alltel Corp., 2006-Ohio-3353, ¶ 36 (Ct. App.); 
Porpora v. Gatliff Bldg. Co., 828 N.E.2d 1081, 1086 (Ohio Ct. App. 2005); Eagle v. Fred 
Martin Motor Co., 809 N.E.2d 1161, 1185 (Ohio Ct. App. 2004); Nefores v. BrandDirect 
Mktg., Inc., 2004-Ohio-5006, ¶ 58 (Ct. App.); Small v. HCF of Perrysburg, Inc., 823 N.E.2d 19, 
24 (Ohio Ct. App. 2004); Angione v. Motorists Mut. Ins. Co., No. CA-9216, 1993 WL 364831, 
at *2 (Ohio Ct. App. Aug. 9, 1993); Cincinnati Ins. Co. v. Apisdorf, No. 61075, 1992 WL 
333131, at *1–2 (Ohio Ct. App. Nov. 12, 1992); Ellison v. Gen. Accident Ins. Co. of Am., No. 
E-90-73, 1991 WL 254232, at *3 (Ohio Ct. App. Nov. 15, 1991); Schaefer v. Allstate Ins. Co., 
No. 90AP-178, 1991 WL 19175, at *3 (Ohio Ct. App. Feb. 12, 1991); In re Wagle v. J.C. 
Penney Cas. Ins. Co., No. 2518, 1989 WL 49404, at *1 (Ohio Ct. App. May 8, 1989); Trupp v. 
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 575 N.E.2d 847, 847 (Ohio Ct. App. 1989), abrogated by 
Schaefer, 590 N.E.2d 1242. 
214. See infra Table 5.  The twelve cases in which appellate courts found a challenged 
non-arbitration contract or clause to be unconscionable between 1987 and 2011 include 
Anderson v. Ballard, 2010-Ohio-3926, ¶ 47 (Ct. App.); Swayne v. Beebles Invs., Inc., 891 
N.E.2d 1216, 1224 (Ohio Ct. App. 2008); Martin v. Byke, 2007-Ohio-6816, ¶ 34 (Ct. App.); 
Scott Reising Jewelers, Inc. v. ADT Sec. Servs., Inc., Nos. C-050322, C-050329, 2006 WL 
6576746, at *3 (Ohio Ct. App. May 10, 2006); Renken Enters. v. Klinck, 2006-Ohio-1444, 
¶¶ 21, 24 (Ct. App.); Muscioni v. Clemons Boat, 2005-Ohio-4349, ¶ 23 (Ct. App.); Amir-
Tahmasseb v. Reyes, 832 N.E.2d 774, 779 (Ohio Ct. App. 2005); O’Donoghue v. Smythe, 
Cramer Co., 2002-Ohio-3447, ¶ 31 (Ct. App.); Taylor v. Eggleston, No. 92-A-1742, 1993 WL 
418489, at *2 (Ohio Ct. App. June 4, 1993); Tillimon v. Dukes, No. L-91-343, 1992 WL 
206878, at *4–5 (Ohio Ct. App. Aug. 28, 1992); Walker v. D.W. Enters., Inc., No. 90-C-38, 
1991 WL 142802, at *2–3 (Ohio Ct. App. July 1, 1991); Orlett v. Suburban Propane, 561 
N.E.2d 1066, 1070 (Ohio Ct. App. 1989). 
215. See infra Table 5.  In addition to the cases cited supra in note 214, courts found 
contract clauses in the following non-arbitration cases to be unconscionable: Lane v. Ultra-
Lite, Inc., No. L-84-087, 1984 WL 14220, at *1–2 (Ohio Ct. App. Aug. 24, 1984); Carl v. 
DeCapua, No. 80AP-889, 1982 WL 3979, at *2–3 (Ohio Ct. App. Feb. 11, 1982); Chem. Bank 
v. Mesler, No. CA79-04-0036, 1981 WL 5115, at *5 (Ohio Ct. App. July 9, 1981); Evans v. 
Graham Ford, Inc., 442 N.E.2d 777, 781 (Ohio Ct. App. 1981); and Youngstown Steel & Alloy 
Corp. v. Automatic Sprinkler Corp. of Am., Nos. 78 C.A. 180, 78 C.A. 181, 1980 Ohio App. 
LEXIS 13954, at *18–19 (Ohio Ct. App. Jan. 22, 1980), aff’d sub. nom. Ins. Co. of N. Am. v. 
Automatic Sprinkler Corp. of Am., 423 N.E.2d 151 (Ohio 1981). 
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more likely to find non-arbitration contracts to be unconscionable than 
arbitration agreements—19.32% to 16.39%, respectively.216 
The thing that was most striking in evaluating these cases, however, 
was the number of cases that could not be fit into either the 
“unconscionable” or “not unconscionable” category.  In a significant 
number of cases, the appellate court did not determine whether the 
contract provision at issue, whether an arbitration clause or not, was 
unconscionable.  Instead, in these cases, the court found that the trial 
court had failed to adequately consider unconscionability and therefore 
remanded the case back to the trial court for further fact-finding, 
evidentiary hearings, or other determinations with respect to the 
unconscionability issue.  Although one finds this result in both 
arbitration and non-arbitration cases, there are some stark differences 
between the two.  On eight occasions between 1980 and 2012, the 
appellate courts remanded non-arbitration cases back to the trial courts 
for an unconscionability determination, amounting to 9.09% of this type 
of case.217 
In contrast, appellate courts have been much more likely to remand 
cases dealing with arbitration clauses back to the trial courts for further 
proceedings related to the unconscionability issue.  On thirty occasions 
the appellate courts have remanded arbitration-clause cases back to the 
trial court for further unconscionability proceedings, a number that 
encompasses 24.59% of all arbitration-clause-unconscionability 
appeals.218  Even more striking, all but eight of these cases were decided 
 
216. See infra Table 5. 
217. See infra Table 5. The eight cases in which appellate courts remanded non-
arbitration contract cases back to the trial court for an unconscionability determination 
include Five Star Fin. Corp. v. Merch.’s Bank & Trust Co., 949 N.E.2d 1016, 1019, 1022 (Ohio 
Ct. App. 2011); Schamer v. W. & S. Life Ins. Co., 2004-Ohio-4249, ¶¶ 17, 20 (Ct. App.); Info. 
Leasing Corp. v. GDR Invs., Inc., 787 N.E.2d 652, 656–57 (Ohio Ct. App. 2003); Beneficial 
Mortg. Co. of Ohio v. Leach, 2002-Ohio-2237, ¶¶ 74, 87 (Ct. App.) (per curiam); Nat’l City 
Bank v. Bailey, No. 2257-M, 1994 WL 122167, at *1 (Ohio Ct. App. Apr. 13, 1994); Norfolk & 
W. Ry. Co. v. A.B.C. Dock, Inc., No. 1809, 1987 WL 10450, at *6, *8 (Ohio Ct. App. Apr. 30, 
1987); Irving Leasing Corp. v. M & H Tire Co., 475 N.E.2d 127, 133 (Ohio Ct. App. 1984); and 
Ins. Co. of N. Am., 423 N.E.2d at 156. 
218. See infra Table 5; see also Brownell v. Van Wyk, 2010-Ohio-6338, ¶ 31 (Ct. App.); 
Reynolds v. Crockett Homes, Inc., 2009-Ohio-1020, ¶ 20 (Ct. App.); Roe v. Rent-A-Center, 
Inc., 2008-Ohio-4307, ¶ 29 (Ct. App.); Blubaugh v. Fred Martin Motors Inc., 2008-Ohio-779, 
¶ 11 (Ct. App); Goodwin v. Ganley, Inc., 2007-Ohio-6327, ¶¶ 13, 17 (Ct. App.); Khoury v. 
Denney Motors Assocs., Inc., 2007-Ohio-5791, ¶¶ 20–21 (Ct. App.); Samoly v. Landry, 2007-
Ohio-5707, ¶¶ 36–37 (Ct. App.); Strader v. Magic Motors of Ohio, Inc., 2007-Ohio-5358, ¶ 31 
(Ct. App.); Barnes v. Andover Vill. Ret. Cmty., Ltd., 2007-Ohio-4112 ¶¶ 34–35 (Ohio App. 
Ct.); Klimaszewski v. Ganley, Inc., 2007-Ohio-3766, ¶ 2 (Ct. App.); Castro v. Higginbotham, 
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between 2003 and 2008, with appellate courts remanding cases nine 
times in 2007 alone.219  Although the numbers at first may not seem that 
significant, an analysis of the percentage of cases remanded for further 
proceedings or fact finding during this time period is instructive.  For 
example, in 2003, cases remanded to trial courts for further proceedings 
related to the unconscionability issue totaled three out of six arbitration-
clause cases, or fifty percent.220  In comparison, the appellate courts did 
not find any arbitration clauses unconscionable that year.221  During the 
following year, 2004, appellate courts remanded three out of twelve 
arbitration cases to the trial courts for further proceedings, or twenty-
five percent of those cases.222  Over the next two years, only four cases 
out of twenty-two were remanded on those grounds.223  But in 2007 there 
was a resurgence—nine out of sixteen cases, or almost two out of three 
arbitration unconscionability cases heard on appeal, were remanded.224  
 
2007-Ohio-3260, ¶ 11 (Ct. App.); Post v. ProCare Auto. Serv. Solutions, 2007-Ohio-2106, ¶ 36 
(Ct. App.); Bencivenni v. Dietz, 2007-Ohio-637, ¶ 15 (Ct. App.); Yessenow v. AUE Design 
Studio, Inc., 848 N.E.2d 563, 566 (Ohio Ct. App. 2006); Olah v. Ganley Chevrolet, Inc., 2006-
Ohio-694, ¶¶ 31–33 (Ct. App.); Molina v. Ponsky, 2005-Ohio-6349, ¶ 24 (Ct. App.); Barr v. 
HCF, Inc., 2005-Ohio-6040, ¶¶ 17, 21 (Ct. App.); Pyle v. Wells Fargo Fin., 2004-Ohio-4892, 
¶ 17 (Ct. App.); Benson v. Spitzer Mgmt., Inc., 2004-Ohio-4751, ¶ 21 (Ct. App.); McKee v. 
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 2004-Ohio-3874, ¶¶ 15–16 (Ct. App.); Hampton 
v. Swad, 2003-Ohio-6655, ¶ 10 (Ct. App.); McDonough v. Thompson, 2003-Ohio-4655, ¶ 20 
(Ct. App.); Miller v. Household Realty Corp., 2003-Ohio-3359, ¶¶ 40–41 (Ct. App.); 
Neubauer v. Household Fin. Corp., 2002-Ohio-6831, ¶ 26 (Ct. App.); Poling v. Am. Suzuki 
Motor Corp., No. 78577, 2001 WL 1075720, at *2–3 (Ohio Ct. App. Sept. 13, 2001); Sikes v. 
Ganley Pontiac Honda, No. 79015, 2001 WL 1075726, at *3 (Ohio Ct. App. Sept. 13, 2001), 
abrogated on other grounds, as recognized in GB AZ 1, LLC v. Ariz. Motors, LLC, 2011-
Ohio-1808, ¶¶ 6–8 (Ct. App.); Battle v. Bill Swad Chevrolet, Inc., 746 N.E.2d 1167, 1172–73 
(Ohio Ct. App. 2000); Haga v. Martin Homes, Inc., No. 1998AP050086, 1999 WL 254530, at 
*5 (Ohio Ct. App. Apr. 19, 1999); Dunn v. L & M Bldg., Inc., No. 75203, 1999 WL 166023, 
at *2 (Ohio Ct. App. Mar. 25, 1999); Smith v. Ohio State Home Servs., Inc., Nos. 16441, 
16445, 1994 WL 200801, at *2 (Ohio Ct. App. May 25, 1994). 
219. See infra Table 5; see also supra note 218. 
220. See infra Table 5; see also Hampton, 2003-Ohio-6655 ¶ 10; McDonough, 2003-Ohio-
4655, ¶ 20; Miller, 2003-Ohio-3359, ¶¶ 40–41. 
221. See infra Table 5. 
222. See infra Table 5; see also Pyle, 2004-Ohio-4892, ¶ 17; Benson, 2004-Ohio-4751, 
¶ 21; McKee, 2004-Ohio-3874, ¶¶ 15–16. 
223. See infra Table 5; see also Yessenow, 848 N.E.2d at 566; Olah, 2006-Ohio-694, 
¶¶ 31–33; Molina, 2005-Ohio-6349, ¶ 24; Barr, 2005-Ohio-6040, ¶¶ 17, 21. 
224. See infra Table 5; see also Goodwin v. Ganley, Inc., 2007-Ohio-6327, ¶ ¶13, 17 (Ct. 
App.); Khoury v. Denney Motors Assocs., Inc., 2007-Ohio-5791, ¶¶ 20–21 (Ct. App.); Samoly 
v. Landry, 2007-Ohio-5707, ¶¶ 36–37 (Ct. App.); Strader v. Magic Motors of Ohio, Inc., 2007-
Ohio-5358, ¶ 31 (Ct. App.); Barnes v. Andover Vill. Ret. Cmty., Ltd., 2007-Ohio-4112 ¶¶ 34–
35 (Ct. App.); Klimaszewski v. Ganley, Inc., 2007-Ohio-3766, ¶ 2 (Ct. App.); Castro v. 
Higginbotham, 2007-Ohio-3260, ¶ 11 (Ct. App.); Post v. ProCare Auto. Serv. Solutions, 2007-
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The following year the numbers again declined, and only two out of 
twelve cases, or 16.67%, were remanded.225  What these numbers suggest 
is that, at the trial level, courts still struggle with how to apply the 
unconscionability doctrine to evaluate arbitration clauses and often fail 
to treat them as they would other contracts.  That is true even though 
trial courts do not seem to face the same problem—that is, at least not 
to the same degree—when they evaluate other, non-arbitration contract 
provisions for unconscionability. 
b. Another Moderate State: Mississippi 
Mississippi is another state that has taken a more moderate 
approach to unconscionability in the context of arbitration agreements.  
Mississippi has applied the unconscionability doctrine in twenty-eight 
cases, including: twenty-two cases in which only arbitration provisions 
were challenged; three cases in which only non-arbitration provisions 
were challenged; and three cases in which both arbitration and non-
arbitration contract clauses were challenged.226  Although since 1980 
Mississippi courts have considered unconscionability arguments much 
more often in cases involving arbitration agreements than other types of 
contract provisions, that fact has not made it more likely that the courts 
were sympathetic to unconscionability arguments in the arbitration 
context; instead, the opposite is true.227 
In the six cases in which Mississippi appellate courts considered non-
arbitration agreements, the courts found the challenged provisions 
unconscionable in five cases, or eighty-three percent of the time.228  In 
contrast, Mississippi courts found arbitration agreements 
unconscionable in seven out of twenty-five cases, or twenty-eight 
 
Ohio-2106, ¶ 36 (Ct. App.); Bencivenni v. Dietz, 2007-Ohio-637, ¶ 15 (Ct. App.). 
225. See infra Table 5; see also Roe v. Rent-A-Center, Inc., 2008-Ohio-4307, ¶ 29 (Ct. 
App.); Blubaugh v. Fred Martin Motors Inc., 2008-Ohio-779, ¶ 11 (Ct. App.). 
226. See infra Table 5. 
227. See infra Table 5. 
228. The five cases in which Mississippi courts found non-arbitration provisions 
unconscionable include Covenant Health Rehab of Picayune, L.P. v. Brown, 949 So. 2d 732, 
741 (Miss. 2007), overruled by Covenant Health & Rehab. of Picayune, LP v. Estate of 
Moulds ex rel. Braddock, 14 So. 3d 695 (Miss. 2009); Vicksburg Partners, L.P. v. Stephens, 911 
So. 2d 507, 525 (Miss. 2005) (en banc), overruled by Estate of Moulds ex rel. Braddock, 14 So. 
3d 695; Pitts v. Watkins, 905 So. 2d 553, 558 (Miss. 2005) (en banc); Entergy Miss., Inc. v. 
Burdette Gin Co., 726 So. 2d 1202, 1208 (Miss. 1998); and Covington v. Griffin, 19 So. 3d 805, 
817 (Miss. Ct. App. 2009). 
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percent of the time.229  In looking solely at the three cases in which the 
courts considered both types of contract provisions, the courts found 
non-arbitration provisions unconscionable in all three cases but only 
found the challenged arbitration provisions unconscionable in one 
case.230 
A couple of other trends are also worth noting.  Like some of the 
states in the other categories, even if a Mississippi appellate court finds 
an arbitration provision unconscionable, it may just sever the offending 
provision and enforce the remainder of the arbitration agreement.231  
Mississippi courts also seem particularly concerned with possible 
unconscionability in the context of nursing home contracts, as eight of 
the cases solely challenging arbitration provisions and two of the cases 
challenging both arbitration and non-arbitration provisions involved 
contracts for nursing home care.232  The courts found unconscionability 
in five of the nursing home cases involving only arbitration clauses233 and 
 
229. The seven cases in which Mississippi courts found arbitration provisions 
unconscionable include Estate of Moulds ex rel. Braddock, 14 So. 3d at 706; Pitts, 905 So. 2d at 
558; E. Ford, Inc. v. Taylor, 826 So. 2d 709, 717 (Miss. 2002) (en banc); Covenant Health & 
Rehab. of Picayune, LP v. Lumpkin ex rel. Lumpkin, 23 So. 3d 1092, 1099 (Miss. Ct. App. 
2009) (en banc); Covenant Health & Rehab. of Picayune, LP v. Estate of Moulds ex rel. 
Braddock, 14 So. 3d 736, 743 (Miss. Ct. App. 2008), rev’d, 14 So. 3d 695 (Miss. 2009); Trinity 
Mission Health & Rehab. of Clinton v. Estate of Scott ex rel. Johnson, 19 So. 3d 735, 741 (Miss. 
Ct. App. 2008); and Trinity Mission of Clinton, LLC v. Barber, 988 So. 2d 910, 924 (Miss. Ct. 
App. 2007).  Despite the fact that the Estate of Moulds ex rel. Braddock decisions involve the 
same parties and legal issues, I have included both decisions because they are technically 
different court decisions.  See generally Estate of Moulds ex rel. Braddock, 14 So. 3d 695; 
Covenant Health & Rehab. of Picayune, LP, 14 So. 3d 736. 
230. See generally Brown, 949 So. 2d 732 (only non-arbitration provisions were 
unconscionable); Vicksburg Partners. L.P., 911 So. 2d 507 (only non-arbitration provisions 
were unconscionable); Pitts, 905 So. 2d 553 (both challenged arbitration and non-arbitration 
provisions were unconscionable). 
231. See, e.g., Covenant Health & Rehab. of Picayune, LP, 14 So. 3d at 743; Estate of 
Scott ex rel. Johnson, 19 So. 3d at 741, 743; Barber, 988 So. 2d at 924. 
232. See Estate of Moulds ex rel. Braddock, 14 So. 3d at 701, 706; Brown, 949 So. 2d at 
741; Vicksburg Partners, L.P., 911 So. 2d at 510, 525; Lumpkin ex rel. Lumpkin, 23 So. 3d at 
1094, 1099; Covenant Health & Rehab. of Picayune, LP, 14 So. 3d at 738, 743; Estate of Scott 
ex rel. Johnson, 19 So. 3d at 741–43; Forest Hill Nursing Ctr., Inc. v. McFarlan, 995 So. 2d 775, 
778, 784–85 (Miss. Ct. App. 2008); Cmty. Care Ctr. of Vicksburg, LLC v. Mason, 966 So. 2d 
220 (Miss. Ct. App. 2007); Barber, 988 So. 2d at 914, 924; Covenant Health & Rehab. of 
Picayune, LP v. Estate of Lambert ex rel. Lambert, 984 So. 2d 283, 285, 289 (Miss. Ct. App. 
2006). 
233. See generally Estate of Moulds ex rel. Braddock, 14 So. 3d 695; Lumpkin ex rel. 
Lumpkin, 23 So. 3d 1092; Scott ex rel. Johnson, 19 So. 3d 735; Covenant Health & Rehab. of 
Picayune, LP, 14 So. 3d 736; Estate of Barber, 988 So. 2d 910. 
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found the regular provisions, but not the arbitration provisions, 
unconscionable in the two combination cases.234 
5. Montana: A Different Approach to the Unconscionability Issue 
On the surface, Montana does not appear much different from many 
of the other states analyzed in this study.  The Montana Supreme Court 
has applied unconscionability analysis to contract provisions on fourteen 
occasions since 1980, including five cases in which arbitration 
agreements were challenged and nine cases involving other types of 
contract provisions.235  The court found that one arbitration agreement 
and one non-arbitration contract had unconscionable provisions, 
amounting to twenty percent and a little over eleven percent of those 
types of provisions, respectively.236  Thus, it appears that based on these 
limited numbers, Montana courts are more likely to find arbitration 
provisions unconscionable than other types of contract provisions. 
These numbers, however, do not tell the entire story.  First, the only 
case in which the Montana Supreme Court found an arbitration 
agreement unconscionable was decided in 1999.237  Thus, for more than a 
decade, no party has successfully used the unconscionability doctrine to 
challenge an arbitration agreement at the appellate level in Montana.  
Like some of the other states,238 Ohio being the most notable,239 Montana 
trial courts also sometimes failed to properly complete the 
unconscionability analysis.  As a result, on four occasions the Montana 
Supreme Court remanded cases back to the trial court for further 
consideration of a party’s unconscionability arguments.240  The remands 
amounted to one-third of unconscionability cases involving non-
arbitration provisions, and one-fifth of those involving arbitration 
agreement challenges.241 
 
234. See generally Brown, 949 So. 2d 732; Vicksburg Partners, 911 So. 2d 507. 
235. See infra Table 6.  Because Montana does not have an intermediate court of 
appeals, the Montana Supreme Court is the only state court with appellate jurisdiction. 
236. See infra Table 6. 
237. See generally Iwen v. U.S. W. Direct, 977 P.2d 989 (Mont. 1999). 
238. See supra notes 127–29 and accompanying text. 
239. See supra notes 217–25 and accompanying text. 
240. See infra Table 6.  One of those cases involved an arbitration agreement.  See 
generally Zigrang v. U.S. Bancorp Piper Jaffray, Inc., 123 P.3d 237 (Mont. 2005).  The other 
three cases involved challenges to non-arbitration provisions.  See generally Am. Music Co. v. 
Higbee, 103 P.3d 518 (Mont. 2004); Kelly v. Widner, 771 P.2d 142 (Mont. 1989); Eigeman v. 
Miller, 745 P.2d 320 (Mont. 1987). 
241. See infra Table 6. 
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But contract law in Montana has evolved somewhat differently than 
it has in the other states analyzed in the instant study.242  Although 
Montana’s unconscionability doctrine has both a procedural and 
substantive component, like many of the states in this study, the 
Montana Supreme Court’s unconscionability analysis is somewhat more 
narrowly focused than the general requirements for procedural and 
substantive unconscionability discussed supra.243  Therefore, the 
Montana Supreme Court has stated that “[u]nconscionability requires a 
two-fold determination: that the contractual terms are unreasonably 
favorable to the drafter and that there is no meaningful choice on the 
part of the other party regarding acceptance of the provisions.”244  
Applying this test, Montana courts first ask whether the contract at issue 
is a contract of adhesion.245  If it is, and the contract terms are more 
favorable to the drafter than the other party, the court will refuse to 
enforce it on the basis of unconscionability.246 
What complicates our understanding of Montana’s approach to the 
unconscionability doctrine is how it intersects with Montana courts’ 
application of the theory of reasonable expectations and its significant 
hostility to contracts of adhesion in general.247  Although the Montana 
Supreme Court may use the unconscionability doctrine to invalidate 
contract provisions, when the case involves a contract of adhesion the 
analysis rarely reaches an unconscionability determination.248  Instead, in 
these circumstances, the court may use the doctrine of reasonable 
expectations or public policy grounds to invalidate the challenged 
contract provision.249 
Even when a contract provision may not be unconscionable, 
Montana courts will refuse to enforce a contract provision when that 
 
242. In fact, one scholar has claimed that “the Montana Supreme Court’s view of 
contract law is out of balance.”  Scott J. Burnham, The War Against Arbitration in Montana, 
66 MONT. L. REV. 139, 150 (2005).  
243. See supra Part II.B.2. 
244. Summers v. Crestview Apartments, 236 P.3d 586, 590 (Mont. 2010) (citing Iwen v. 
U.S. W. Direct, 977 P.2d 989, 995 (Mont. 1999)). 
245. See, e.g., Graziano v. Stock Farm Homeowners Ass’n, 258 P.3d 999, 1004 (Mont. 
2011). 
246. See, e.g., Summers, 236 P.3d at 590–91 (holding that accelerated rent clause in lease 
agreement was unconscionable because lease was a contract of adhesion and clause unfairly 
benefited landlord more than tenant). 
247. See id. at 590–91. 
248. See id. 
249. See Graziano, 258 P.3d at 1004. 
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provision fails to meet the reasonable expectations of the non-drafting 
party.250  The doctrine of reasonable expectations was first applied to 
insurance contracts, but courts have also applied it to many other types 
of contracts.251  The Montana Supreme Court has stated that: 
Reasonable expectations derive from all of the circumstances 
surrounding the execution of a contract, such as the business 
experience and sophistication of the consumer . . . any routine 
practices between the parties established through prior dealings, 
whether the consumer studied the agreement and understood it, 
whether the consumer had the advice or representation of 
counsel, and whether the provisions of the agreement were 
explained to the consumer.252 
Legal scholar Scott Burnham has argued that the Montana Supreme 
Court has modified the doctrine of reasonable expectations to make it 
easier to invalidate arbitrate agreements specifically, evidencing the 
court’s ongoing hostility to arbitration.253 
Although Montana courts separate an inquiry into the parties’ 
reasonable expectations from their unconscionability analysis, these 
types of circumstances appear to be exactly the types of facts often 
considered by courts in determining whether a contract is procedurally 
unconscionable.254  Thus, although the Montana Supreme Court has not 
specifically defined its reasonable expectations analysis in terms of the 
unconscionability doctrine, a reasonable conclusion is that it could fit 
within that framework.  For purposes of this study, however, I based my 
evaluation of Montana case law solely on the Montana court’s definition 
and use of the unconscionability doctrine.  Therefore, these numbers do 
not include cases where the Montana Supreme Court determined that a 
contract was unenforceable based upon a determination that the 
contract did not meet the challenging party’s reasonable expectations. 
 
250. See id.  Scott Burnham has described these types of contract provisions in this way: 
“Knowing that I am unlikely to read it, the drafter might . . . take advantage of [his] superior 
bargaining position to slip in terms which, even though not unconscionable, would not be 
reasonably expected by a party to that contract.”  Burnham, supra note 242, at 154. 
251. See Burnham, supra note 242, at 153–55. 
252. Graziano, 258 P.3d at 1004–05 (citing Woodruff v. Bretz, Inc., 218 P.3d 486, 491 
(Mont. 2009)). 
253. See generally Burnham, supra note 242. 
254. See supra notes 58–64 and accompanying text. 
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V. CONCLUSIONS 
So, the real question is, what do all of these numbers mean?  
Certainly, one of the first conclusions that can be drawn is that at least 
some of our understanding of how state courts apply the 
unconscionability doctrine to arbitration agreements needs to be 
reconsidered in light of the numbers.  Although there are still some 
states, such as Missouri, Nevada, New Mexico, and Illinois, that are 
more likely to find arbitration agreements unconscionable than other 
types of contracts,255 the vast majority of states do not appear to take 
that approach.256  Instead, there is quite a bit of variety in how state 
courts view the unconscionability doctrine in general, as well as how 
they apply the doctrine to both arbitration and non-arbitration 
provisions. 
In fact, some states really do not have much of a track record 
regarding unconscionability at all,257 especially in comparison to states 
like California,258 or, in this study, Ohio.259  Other states may have cases 
that, if viewed in isolation, would suggest hostility towards arbitration 
agreements.  However, when viewed in the context of more than thirty 
years of case law, those cases prove to be outliers that do not represent 
the whole.  Thus, before drawing conclusions about an individual state’s 
application of the unconscionability doctrine to arbitration agreements, 
it is really necessary to specifically investigate that particular state’s case 
law on the issue.260 
 
255. See infra Table 4. 
256. See supra Part IV. 
257. See infra Table 2. 
258. See generally Broome, supra note 4. 
259. See supra Part IV.B.4.a. 
260. This study analyzed the case law from only twenty states.  Although a sample of 
forty percent is substantial and provides a good understanding of the full unconscionability 
spectrum, it is impossible to know with certainty where other states fall on that spectrum 
without taking a similar approach to those states’ case law.  Further, future studies may 
choose to delve further into the factual bases of these cases and how courts apply the 
unconscionability doctrine to specific contexts in order to determine what further patterns 
emerge.  For example, it may be possible to develop our understanding of the 
unconscionability doctrine even further by examining who was more likely to appeal the trial 
court’s determinations regarding unconscionability: (1) the party who asserted 
unconscionability as a defense, who lost at the trial level, or (2) the party who argued against 
unconscionability at the trial level, but lost.  It would also be useful to further explore the 
types of provisions the courts have found more and less problematic, and also the general 
types of contracts found unconscionable or not unconscionable (i.e., nursing home, 
employment, consumer, insurance, commercial, etc.).  Finally, it would also be instructive to 
look for correlations between the issuance of major U.S. Supreme Court precedents on the 
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Another conclusion can also be drawn from the numbers.  For at 
least some states that have drawn criticism for their application of the 
unconscionability doctrine to arbitration agreements, such as Ohio, 
those cases can be outliers that are not representative of the general 
rule.  And case law further suggests that, at least in some states, there 
has been an improvement in the courts’ analysis of unconscionability 
issues and the development on a more sophisticated understanding of 
unconscionability law.261  These results suggest that other states may 
moderate their approach to unconscionability in the long term, 
especially in light of U.S. Supreme Court cases such as AT&T Mobility 
LLC v. Concepcion.262  Ultimately, this study suggests that it is best to 
withhold judgment regarding individual states’ approaches to 
unconscionability, at least until it is possible to ground oneself in that 
state’s case law on the issue.  Although the unconscionability doctrine 
has a long history, it is still in flux, particularly in its application to 
arbitration agreements. 
  
 
unconscionability issue. 
261. See supra Part IV. 
262. See supra Part IV. 
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Table 1263 
Unconscionability Cases—All 20 States 
Year Non-arb/ 
OK 
Non-arb/
unc 
Non-arb/
remand 
Arb/
OK 
Arb/
unc 
Arb/
remand 
All 
Cases 
Total 
Unc 
2012 1 0 0  9 3 0  13 3 
2011 5 2 1  10 5 0  22 6 
2010 11 2 0  8 4 2  26 6 
2009 10 4 0  9 7 1  30 11 
2008 2 1 0  15 9 3  30 10 
2007 6 2 0  13 4 10  34 6 
2006 7 3 0  15 5 2  32 8 
2005 5 5 0  12 4 3  27 8 
2004 3 0 2  13 5 4  27 5 
2003 5 0 1  6 2 3  17 2 
2002 5 1 1  10 2 1  19 3 
2001 3 0 0  2 0 2  7 0 
2000 2 2 0  4 1 1  9 3 
1999 9 1 0  1 1 2  14 2 
1998 5 1 0  4 1 0  11 2 
1997 3 0 0  0 0 0  3 0 
1996 6 0 0  0 0 0  6 0 
1995 6 0 0  1 0 0  7 0 
1994 6 0 1  0 0 1  8 0 
1993 4 1 0  2 1 0  8 2 
1992 2 2 1  2 2 0  9 4 
1991 5 3 0  2 2 0  12 5 
1990 7 1 0  0 0 0  8 1 
1989 5 1 1  0 2 0  9 3 
1988 1 1 0  1 0 0  3 1 
1987 7 1 3  1 0 0  12 1 
1986 7 3 0  1 0 0  11 3 
1985 8 0 0  0 0 0  8 0 
1984 6 2 1  0 0 0  9 2 
1983 6 0 0  1 0 0  7 0 
1982 4 2 0  0 0 0  6 2 
1981 6 3 1  0 0 0  10 3 
1980 4 2 0  0 0 0  6 2 
TOTAL 172 46 13  142 60 35  460
264
 105 
 
263. For each year of the study, this chart provides the following information: (1) the 
number of non-arbitration cases in which appellate courts rejected unconscionability 
arguments; (2) the number of non-arbitration cases in which courts determined that 
provisions were unconscionable; (3) the number of non-arbitration cases remanded to the 
trial court for further unconscionability determinations; (4) the number of arbitration cases in 
which courts rejected unconscionability arguments; (5) the number of arbitration cases in 
which courts determined that provisions were unconscionable; (6) the number of arbitration 
cases remanded to the trial court for further unconscionability determinations; (7) the total 
number of cases in which courts considered unconscionability arguments; and (8) the total 
number of cases in which courts found any contract provision unconscionable. 
264. Eight cases included in this study contain both arbitration and non-arbitration 
provisions and have thus been accounted for in both the arbitration and non-arbitration 
columns of Table 1, but appear as a single case for purposes of the total cases column.  The 
years affected by these dual-provision cases include 2000, 2002, 2005 (two cases), 2007, 2009, 
2010, and 2011.  See infra notes 265–68.
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Table 2 
The “Conservative” Approach to Unconscionability 
States Total 
Cases 
Arb 
Cases 
Non-
arb 
Cases 
Total arb
Unconscion-
able 
Total  
non-arb 
Unconscion-
able 
Colorado 9 2 7 0 1 
Maine 0 0 0 n/a n/a 
Maryland 10 5 5 0 0 
Minnesota 22 1 21 0 2 
Nebraska 5 0 5 n/a 1 
New 
Hampshire 5 0 5 n/a 1 
North 
Carolina 20 8 12 1 0 
Oregon 9 7 2 1 1 
Rhode 
Island 2 0 2 n/a 1 
South 
Carolina 9 7 2 1 0 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
LANDRUM-FINAL (7-10-14) (DO NOT DELETE) 7/10/2014  10:35 AM 
806 MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW [97:3 
 
 
 
Table 3 
States that Generally Embrace the Unconscionability Doctrine 
States Total 
Cases 
Arb 
Cases 
Non-
arb 
Cases 
Total arb
Unconscion-
able 
Total non-arb 
Unconscion-
able 
Alaska 11 3 8 1 4 
Arkansas 11 1 10 1 4 
Vermont 6265 1 6 1 3 
 
 
Table 4 
States More Sympathetic to the Unconscionability Doctrine in the 
Arbitration Context 
States Total 
Cases 
Arb 
Cases 
Non-
arb 
Cases 
Total arb
Unconscion-
able 
Total  
non-arb 
Unconscion
-able 
Missouri 24 13 11 10 2 
Nevada 9 7 2 3 0 
New Mexico 15 9 6 7 0 
Illinois 43266 21 24 6 3 
 
  
 
265. One of the Vermont cases involved both arbitration and non-arbitration provisions, 
and the Vermont Supreme Court found that both types of clauses were unconscionable.  See 
Glassford v. BrickKicker, 35 A.3d 1044, 1054 (Vt. 2011).  Thus, this Table counts that case in 
both categories. 
266. Two of the Illinois cases involve unconscionabilty analysis of both arbitration and 
non-arbitration provisions, and, thus, they are counted in both categories.  Those cases 
include All Am. Roofing, Inc. v. Zurich Am. Ins. Co., 934 N.E.2d 679 (Ill. App. Ct. 2010); and 
Bishop v. We Care Hair Dev. Corp., 738 N.E.2d 610 (Ill. App. Ct. 2000).
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Table 5 
States with a Moderate Approach to the Unconscionability Doctrine 
States Total 
Cases 
Arb 
Cases 
Non-
arb 
Cases 
Total arb
Unconscion-
able 
Total  
non-arb 
Unconscion-
able 
Ohio 208267 122 88 20 17 
Mississippi 28268 25 6 7 5 
 
 
Table 6 
Montana’s Approach to the Unconscionability Doctrine 
States Total 
Cases 
Arb 
Cases 
Non-
arb 
Cases 
Total arb
Unconscion-
able 
Total 
non-arb 
Unconscion-
able 
Montana 14 5 9 1 1 
  
 
267. Two of the Ohio cases involve unconscionabilty analysis of both arbitration and 
non-arbitration provisions, and, thus, they are counted in both categories.  Those cases 
include Bozich v. Kozusko, 2009-Ohio-6908 (Ct. App.); and O’Donoghue v. Smythe, Cramer 
Co., 2002-Ohio-3447 (Ct. App.). 
268. Three of the Mississippi cases involve unconscionability analysis of both arbitration 
and non-arbitration provisions, and, thus, they are counted in both categories.  Those cases 
include Covenant Health Rehab of Picayune, L.P. v. Brown, 949 So. 2d 732 (Miss. 2007), 
overruled by Covenant Health & Rehab. of Picayune, LP v. Estate of Moulds ex rel. 
Braddock, 14 So. 3d 695 (Miss. 2009); Vicksburg Partners, L.P. v. Stephens, 911 So. 2d 507 
(Miss. 2005) (en banc), overruled by Estate of Moulds ex rel. Braddock, 14 So. 3d 695; and 
Pitts v. Watkins, 905 So. 2d 553 (Miss. 2005) (en banc). 
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